Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-14
Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 25 September 2012 17:13 UTC
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Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2012 19:13:12 +0200
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals.all@tools.ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-14
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Nope, but that's per the process described in http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/sec/trac/wiki/SecDirReview. The WG chairs are supposedly on the ".all" alias. Thanks, Yaron On 09/25/2012 07:06 PM, Sean Turner wrote: > Did these ever make it to the krb-wg mailing list? > > spt > > On 9/23/12 4:46 PM, Yaron Sheffer wrote: >> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's >> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. >> These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security >> area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these >> comments just like any other last call comments. >> >> This document adds a "referral" mechanism to Kerberos, where a client >> (e.g. an end user) can use a generic enterprise-wide name, and have it >> mapped to one that is specific to its correct realm; similarly, a >> generic name can be used for a service, and the KDC will respond with >> the correct principal name (and realm) for the service. >> >> Summary >> >> It is obvious that the analysis in the document's Security >> Considerations is very thorough. Unfortunately I do not have the >> Kerberos expertise (which apparently requires knowledge of specific >> implementations' quirky behavior) to determine if all relevant cases >> were covered. >> >> A cursory reading of the Considerations is quite discouraging: several >> security mechanisms exist but they are not universally applied, some >> implementations do not even follow the base protocol etc. I can only >> hope that modern Kerberos implementations have improved in the 11 years >> since this protocol first got started. >> >> Details >> >> - Sec. 4: "trusted name service" is not well defined. In fact it can be >> construed as a euphemism for "enterprise-internal DNS", which is advised >> against earlier. >> - 4.1, last paragraph: is there no possibility to an "issuing realm" to >> "publish" ownership of some resources to the consuming realm, and thus >> effectively claim those resources? >> - 6. In the authorization ASN.1 snippet, what is the value of MAX? >> - 7, first paragraph: when the client sends the request to example.com, >> shouldn't it ensure first that it has a pre-existing (pre-configured) >> trust relationship with example.com? >> - 10: the last paragraph ("Accordingly") is a bit too vague and probably >> does not provide implementors with sufficient advice. >> - 10: overall it is not clear if this section also applies to caching of >> client referrals. >> - 11: surprise! FAST (which was an optional SHOULD in Sec. 6) is now a >> MUST! Even if it's just FAST negotiation that's a MUST, but FAST itself >> (or an equivalent) is just a SHOULD, this still doesn't make a lot of >> sense, and should at least be explained. >> - 11: this section defines a new structure, but only explains a few of >> its members. Please mention where all the other members are defined (RFC >> 4120?). By the way, key-expiration is said to be deprecated in RFC 4120, >> but what do I know. >> - General: the document is said to update RFC 4120. A short section with >> a summary of the specific updates would be very useful, so that >> implementors can find out if they need to change anything, even if they >> do NOT support the Referral functionality. (This is really a shortcoming >> of the IETF notion of "RFC X updates RFC Y.") >> - Appendix A: in "current implementation", do you mean post-Win 2003? >> Please clarify. >> - Appendix A: a reference to the MS documentation might be appropriate: >> http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc233855(v=prot.13).aspx >> >> Thanks, >> Yaron >> >> _______________________________________________ >> secdir mailing list >> secdir@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir >> wiki: http://tools.ietf.org/area/sec/trac/wiki/SecDirReview >>
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-camarillo-rai-med… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-camarillo-rai… Gonzalo Camarillo
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-camarillo-rai… Gonzalo Camarillo
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-yegin-pana-encr-a… Yaron Sheffer
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerbe… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-k… Sean Turner
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-k… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-k… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-k… Sam Hartman
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-k… Tom Yu
- [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-ietf-… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-i… Alexey Melnikov
- [secdir] Use of StringPrep/Unicode (was Re: SecDi… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [secdir] Use of StringPrep/Unicode (was Re: S… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-i… Mallikarjun Chadalapaka
- Re: [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-i… Mallikarjun Chadalapaka
- Re: [secdir] Use of StringPrep/Unicode (was Re: S… Black, David
- Re: [secdir] Use of StringPrep/Unicode (was Re: S… Black, David
- Re: [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-i… Black, David
- Re: [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-i… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-i… Mallikarjun Chadalapaka
- Re: [secdir] SecDir and AppsDir review of draft-i… Alexey Melnikov
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-6renum-enter… Yaron Sheffer
- [secdir] SecDir repeat review of draft-ietf-6renu… Yaron Sheffer
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-ipfrr-… Yaron Sheffer
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-clue-telepre… Yaron Sheffer
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-v6ops-64shar… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-v6ops-64… Vízdal Aleš
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-v6ops-64… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-v6ops-64… Vízdal Aleš