Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)

["John G. Scudder" <[e-mail]>]

Stewart,

I'm fine with the text you propose.

(I do find it a little odd to have this text -- either old or new -- in the Security section since routing loops aren't normally though of as a security issue unless maliciously triggered -- which this one isn't described as being. So I would also be fine with changing the text but moving it to a different section. But that is quibbling.)

--John

On Jul 17, 2012, at 12:24 AM, Stewart Bryant wrote:

> Sue, John,
> 
> Is there any reason not to reword the text concerned to more
> conventional format:
> 
> OLD
> It is a misconfiguration to assign a non-mappable four-octet AS
>    number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all
>    the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to
>    support four-octet AS numbers.  Such a misconfiguration would weaken
>    the AS path loop detection within a confederation.
> 
> NEW
> 
> A network operator MUST NOT assign a non-mappable four-octet AS 
> number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all 
> the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to 
> support four-octet AS numbers, as such an assignment would weaken 
> the AS path loop detection within a confederation. 
> 
> Stewart
> 
> On 17/07/2012 00:28, Susan Hares wrote:
>> Catherine:
>>  
>> I’ve read and re-read this email for a week (7/9 – 7/16).
>>  
>> Misconfiguration is a fact of life in networks.  Security profiles must deal with this point.  We can all say you should not misconfigure networks – but life happens.  Therefore,  I’m confused by your question.  I would consider it is just a security event the authors pointing happens.
>>  
>> On your second comment
>>  
>> “I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out conversion from 4-octet
>> to 2-octet occurring between confederations would be much less than of their occurring
>> within a confederation (although one can't know for sure without knowing what the 4-octet
>> to 2-octet mapping is), so following the recommendations in the Security Considerations would
>> greatly reduce the probability of such a routing loop occurring.  Is this correct? “
>>  
>> It depends if someone configures a confederation within a confederation.   [see earlier comment on mis-configuration.] I’ve copied Sandy Murphy in case as SIDR chair can put this discussion into a different “security” specific light. 
>>  
>> Confused,
>>  
>> Sue
>>  
>>  
>> From: Catherine Meadows [mailto:[e-mail]] 
>> Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 2:25 PM
>> To: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
>> Cc: Catherine Meadows
>> Subject: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
>>  
>> I managed to screw up the email address again.  Here it is for what I hope is the last time.
>> My apologies again to everyone who receives *three* copies of this message.
>>  
>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
>> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
>> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
>> these comments just like any other last call comments.
>> 
>> This document describes an added capability for four-octet Autonomous System
>> (AS) numbers in BGP.  This is intended to  replace the older two-octet AS numbers,
>> since that space is filling up.
>> 
>> In order to preserve backward compatibility, AS's using the four-octet systems (called New
>> BGP speakers in the document) must advertise both four-octet and two-octet AS numbers.
>> This is the case even if the New BGP Speaker does not have a globally unique two-octet number.
>> The document says that in this case the two-octet number is obtained by mapping the four-octet
>> number to the two-octet space.  The procedure for doing this is not specified.
>> 
>> The authors identify a risk of routing loops developing when ambiguities develops as a
>> result of a BGP speaker using the old system aggregating two or more routes carrying
>> 4-octet attributes.  In the Security Configurations Section, the authors point out that an
>> attacker might be able to exploit this in a denial of service attack.  They point out that it is
>> a misconfiguration to assign 4-octet Member AS Numbers in a BGP confederation until all BGP speakers
>> within the confederation have transitioned to support 4-octet numbers.
>> 
>> I think that this is a good recommendation.  I just have a couple of minor comments.
>> 
>> It's not clear to me what the status of "misconfiguration" is in the hierarchy of IETF.
>> Is it more like SHALL NOT or SHOULD NOT?  Is there a reason why you're saying
>> "misconfiguration" instead of one of those?
>> 
>> I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out conversion from 4-octet
>> to 2-octet occurring between confederations would be much less than of their occurring
>> within a confederation (although one can't know for sure without knowing what the 4-octet
>> to 2-octet mapping is), so following the recommendations in the Security Considerations would
>> greatly reduce the probability of such a routing loop occurring.  Is this correct? 
>> 
>> Cathy Meadows
>> Catherine Meadows
>> Naval Research Laboratory
>> Code 5543
>> 4555 Overlook Ave., S.W.
>> Washington DC, 20375
>> phone: [phone]
>> fax: [phone]
>> email: [e-mail]
>>  
> 
> 
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