[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-teas-ietf-network-slice-nbi-yang-17

Mike Ounsworth via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 02 January 2025 04:09 UTC

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Subject: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-teas-ietf-network-slice-nbi-yang-17
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Reviewer: Mike Ounsworth
Review result: Ready

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

This document is defining configuration data for use with the Network Slice
Service. The Security Considerations section properly outlines that the Network
Slice Service includes a secure transport layer (SSH / TLS), as well as an
access control layer, and it identifies that some configuration values may be
write-sensitive / read-sensitive, and that it is up to the operator to properly
enforce these protections. I think this sufficiently covers security concerns
related to configuration data.