Re: [secdir] [websec] Fwd: SecDir review of draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob-00

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Thu, 07 February 2013 08:10 UTC

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Date: Thu, 07 Feb 2013 08:10:48 +0000
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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
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Cc: "ietf-websec-sessions@googlegroups.com" <ietf-websec-sessions@googlegroups.com>, IETF WebSec WG <websec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] [websec] Fwd: SecDir review of draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob-00
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On 7 February 2013 07:46, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote (that I wrote):
> " 10. Must work across all types of proxies. Proxies that can modify
>
>        the plaintext HTTP requests and responses can (but should not)
>        interfere with any session continuation protocol."
>
> A man-in-the-middle is a type of proxy, so this seems like an
> unsatisfiable requirement.

Actually, that's not quite right. Protocols can work across a proxy,
but what's required is that the proxy does not gain the ability to
pretend to be one of the endpoints.

If you satisfy this, then a MitM can snoop, but can't masquerade.

But this seems to impose quite a strong constraint on the protocol: in
particular, future traffic must somehow be bound to the (end-to-end)
session continuation.

[secdir] Fwd: RE: SecDir review of draft-williams… Stephen Farrell
Re: [secdir] Fwd: RE: SecDir review of draft-will… Ben Laurie
Re: [secdir] [websec] Fwd: SecDir review of draft… Ben Laurie