Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-josefsson-kerberos5-starttls-08
Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> Tue, 02 February 2010 14:08 UTC
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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Magnus Nyström <magnusn@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 02 Feb 2010 15:08:59 +0100
In-Reply-To: <2f57b9e61002012044h4de38c83i57ef62873a0cd87f@mail.gmail.com> ("Magnus Nyström"'s message of "Mon, 1 Feb 2010 20:44:32 -0800")
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Cc: larry.zhu@microsoft.com, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-josefsson-kerberos5-starttls-08
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Thanks Magnus, I like your new text. It appears to me like a non-technical change, so I'll apply this change to my local copy. I'll wait until after the IESG evaluation to submit a new version though, unless someone feels this should be done sooner for some reason? /Simon Magnus Nyström <magnusn@gmail.com> writes: > This is a follow-up to the review I made back in December on version > -07 of this document. > > Simon has implemented all the changes I proposed (and more!) and I > have only one comment on this version, pertaining to the new text in > Section 5. I cannot judge the validity of the statement that "Many > client environments [presumably the ones that this protocol targets] > do not have secure long-term storage, which is required to validate > certificates", but assuming this statement is true, then, for clarity, > I would suggest changing the 2nd and 3rd paragraph of the section to: > > " > A goal for the protocol described in this memo is that it should be as > easy to implement and deploy on clients as support for UDP/TCP. Since > many client environments do not have secure long-term storage (and > server certificate validation requires some form of long-term > storage), the Kerberos V5 STARTTLS protocol does not require clients > to verify server certificates. If server certification had been > required, then environments with constrained clients such as those > mentioned would be forced to disable TLS; this would arguably be worse > than TLS without server certificate validation as use of TLS, even > without server certificate validation, protects against some attacks > that Kerberos V5 over UDP/TCP do not. For example, even without server > certificate validation, TLS does protect against passive network > sniffing aimed at tracking Kerberos service usage by a given client. > > Note however that use of TLS without server certificate verification > opens up for a range of active attacks such as man-in-the-middle. > " > > Best, > -- Magnus
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-josefsson-kerbero… Magnus Nyström
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-josefsson-ker… Simon Josefsson
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-josefsson-ker… Polk, William T.
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-josefsson-ker… Simon Josefsson