[secdir] draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf-15

"Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com> Thu, 19 November 2015 16:20 UTC

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From: "Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com>
To: "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf.all@tools.ietf.org>
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Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 16:20:23 +0000
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Subject: [secdir] draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf-15
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

I believe this draft is ready with (possibly minor) issues:

In Section 2.1.1, the authors describe BFD Authentication, and it seems quite appropriate and well described.  I was, however, wondering if authentication (the same sub-TLV or different) was needed or should be used for the mechanisms in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3.  If the authentication described by 2.1.1 is already expected to be applicable to these other TLVs, it was not immediately clear.  Maybe some additional description of this would be helpful to readers.

In Section 3, there is a great level of granularity proposed around describing authorization errors: Auth not supported, Type not supported, and Key mismatch (this is excellent).  One question, is there a missing statement for an outright authentication failure?

In Section 6 Security Considerations, it would be nice (if possible) to mention any privacy considerations.  For example, can an unauthorized agents probe capabilities or configurations (such as, authentication or otherwise) of devices?  That is, can someone learn that authentication is being required, and what parameters are needed, etc?  Is all data transmitted in the clear?

Eric