Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig
"Adam W. Montville" <adam.w.montville@gmail.com> Wed, 14 January 2015 17:35 UTC
Return-Path: <adam.w.montville@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1441A1A912C; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 09:35:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3gyW8sc7HsGm; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 09:35:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-ob0-x22c.google.com (mail-ob0-x22c.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c01::22c]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4E8D01A9129; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 09:35:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-ob0-f172.google.com with SMTP id va8so9237388obc.3; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 09:35:52 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=content-type:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=1epEf64YfM+h3Cqhojp4g4y3PJ4D+XsMahXB6dnkCqw=; b=iiP+O+GwnmoXPoJGbvZd/Fyq+mZFINY760q66o4CuKsmfqrC3j4YheLJfUsM2JxlC+ a/dZlJjwqyOJssS8NwrpT7LgHJ6ko9RrvfwmlfDKG5gsrFaL9Zbu/YczcVNOvVSr6Cxb GL0yt2d9jep/kfULZgUXy9LCporHrpbXb0RZR5uedusls1F9HvxcF3Gpa6QOIbLcFLaj KZ1ehUU7Aj9emwgbxU4Sjf1Yzp4cLLALg34ehddbIR9k12D9BHi8Yq0LdCAff+lzc24Z 5PZf/pQsxk7HdERiaJ5BwgnknDwzQC4yr9uvB8MbGNuCcXWZLfD81By4DDFt4nWiQtol /O3g==
X-Received: by 10.202.52.131 with SMTP id b125mr2973634oia.93.1421256952608; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 09:35:52 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ?IPv6:2602:306:3406:4f00:e07a:916d:2608:e39b? ([2602:306:3406:4f00:e07a:916d:2608:e39b]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id o5sm12333942obz.9.2015.01.14.09.35.50 (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Wed, 14 Jan 2015 09:35:51 -0800 (PST)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.1 \(1993\))
From: "Adam W. Montville" <adam.w.montville@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <E6065BA2-29AD-4B7A-A444-F50A37B19B35@piuha.net>
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2015 11:35:12 -0600
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <12EC5C84-0AA7-44FA-B571-5BD1A792E21D@gmail.com>
References: <47E19730-5BE8-4CC1-9DB3-A341465A5BDB@gmail.com> <D0DB2787.B8DE%acee@cisco.com> <D0DB3988.B91C%acee@cisco.com> <E6065BA2-29AD-4B7A-A444-F50A37B19B35@piuha.net>
To: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1993)
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/oFFcbTVH7m_qBO6SWAzF2Y7wgvI>
Cc: "draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig.all@tools.ietf.org>, "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2015 17:35:56 -0000
Glad to be of service. It all looks good to me. > On Jan 14, 2015, at 5:08 AM, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net> wrote: > > Adam, > > Many thanks for your review. I agree with Acee’s suggested edits. > > Jari > > On 14 Jan 2015, at 04:07, Acee Lindem (acee) <acee@cisco.com> wrote: > >> Hi Adam, >> Here are the updates I’m proposing to address your comments: >> >> *** 180,185 **** >> --- 180,188 ---- >> Thanks to Martin Vigoureux for Routing Area Directorate review and >> comments. >> >> + Thanks to Adam Montville for Security Area Directorate review and >> + comments. >> + >> Special thanks go to Markus Stenberg for his implementation of this >> specification in Bird. >> >> *************** >> >> *** 451,464 **** >> >> 5. OSPFv3 Router ID Selection >> >> ! An OSPFv3 router requires a unique Router ID for correct protocol >> ! operation. An OSPFv3 router implementing this specification will >> ! select a router-id that has a high probability of uniqueness. A >> ! pseudo-random number SHOULD be used for the OSPFv3 Router ID. The >> ! generation should be seeded with a variable that is likely to be >> ! unique in the applicable OSPFv3 router deployment. A good choice of >> ! seed would be some portion or hash of the Router-Hardware-Fingerprint >> ! as described in Section 7.2.2. >> >> Since there is a possibility of a Router ID collision, duplicate >> Router ID detection and resolution are required as described in >> --- 451,465 ---- >> >> 5. OSPFv3 Router ID Selection >> >> ! An OSPFv3 router requires a unique Router ID within the OSPFv3 >> ! routing domain for correct protocol operation. An OSPFv3 router >> ! implementing this specification will select a router-id that has a >> ! high probability of uniqueness. A pseudo-random number SHOULD be >> ! used for the OSPFv3 Router ID. The generation SHOULD be seeded with >> ! a variable that is likely to be unique in the applicable OSPFv3 >> ! router deployment. A good choice of seed would be some portion or >> ! hash of the Router-Hardware-Fingerprint as described in >> ! Section 7.2.2. >> >> Since there is a possibility of a Router ID collision, duplicate >> Router ID detection and resolution are required as described in >> *************** >> >> *** 799,810 **** >> automatic pairing between devices. These mechanisms can help provide >> an automatically configured, securely routed network. >> >> ! >> ! >> ! >> ! >> ! >> ! >> >> >> >> --- 799,810 ---- >> automatic pairing between devices. These mechanisms can help provide >> an automatically configured, securely routed network. >> >> ! In deployments where stronger authentification or encryption is >> ! required, OSPFv3 IPsec [OSPFV3-IPSEC] or stronger OSPFv3 >> ! Authentication trailer [OSPFV3-AUTH-TRAILER] algorithms MAY be used >> ! at the expense of additional configuration. The configuration and >> ! operational description of such deployments is beyond the scope of >> ! this document. >> >> >> >> *************** >> >> >> Thanks, >> Acee >> >> On 1/13/15, 8:14 PM, "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com> wrote: >> >>> Hi Adam, >>> >>> On 1/13/15, 12:26 PM, "Adam W. Montville" <adam.w.montville@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's >>>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. >>>> These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security >>>> area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these >>>> comments just like any other last call comments. >>>> >>>> This draft is ready with comments/nits. >>>> >>>> Comments >>>> The document describes necessary mechanisms for OSPFv3 to be >>>> self-configuring in environments requiring such (e.g. IPv6 home >>>> networks). >>>> >>>> A couple of things stood out to me. First, I inferred from the document >>>> that the uniqueness of Router IDs is so within the context of the present >>>> deployment and not, for example, unique between domains. This may be >>>> common knowledge in the world of OSPF, but wasn¹t to me (at least not >>>> initially). It could be good to add a sentence about the context of >>>> Router ID uniqueness early on in the document. >>> >>> I will add a statement to section 5. >>> >>>> >>>> Also regarding uniqueness of the ID, Section 5, ³OSPFv3 Router ID >>>> Selection², indicates that a pseudo-random number SHOULD be used to >>>> derive the Router ID. Later in that first paragraph: ³The generation >>>> should be seeded with a variable that is likely to be unique in the >>>> applicable OSPFv3 router deployment.² Should that ³should² be ³SHOULD²? >>> >>> Yes - these two sentences definitely SHOULD be consistent. >>> >>>> >>>> The document clearly recognizes the possibility for Router ID collisions, >>>> and there does not appear to be a need for a cryptographically sound >>>> pseudo-random number generation - just enough entropy to make the Router >>>> ID unique within the deployment domain, and the >>>> Router-Hardware-Fingerprint TLV (Section 7.2.2) is presented as being >>>> enough. >>> >>> Do you feel that a statement with respect to the pseudo-random algorithm >>> is necessary? If so, can you suggest some text? >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Because this document essentially explains the OSPFv3 defaults a router >>>> should have in order to support auto-configuration, I presumed that the >>>> security considerations provided in previous OSPFv3 documents would >>>> essentially be in effect here. This isn¹t explicitly stated in the >>>> Security Considerations section, but could be without harm, should they >>>> apply here. The bottom line for me is that it seems that OSPFv3 >>>> auto-configuration favors usability over security, but without ignoring >>>> security entirely (e.g. ³auto-configuration can also be combined with >>>> password configuration or future extensions for automatic pairing between >>>> devices.²). >>> >>> I agree with the above except that the document doesn't address all the >>> available OSPFv3 security options. Let me add a paragraph. >>> >>> I will provide some updated text for review prior to republishing. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Acee >>> >>> >> >
- [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-… Adam W. Montville
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-osp… Acee Lindem (acee)
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-osp… Acee Lindem (acee)
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-osp… Jari Arkko
- Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-osp… Adam W. Montville