Re: [secdir] review of draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-05

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> Fri, 08 January 2010 18:22 UTC

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Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2010 13:22:19 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <phoffman@imc.org>
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Cc: secdir@ietf.org, dol@cryptocom.ru, ogud@ogud.com, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [secdir] review of draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-gost-05
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On Fri, Jan 08, 2010 at 08:12:29AM -0800, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> It is for this reason that DNSSEC does not, for example, require
> that resolvers MUST be able to validate RSA signatures with 256-bit
> keys. However, by saying that resolvers MUST be able to validate
> anything other than the widely-agreed-to algorithms, you are opening
> up such an attack.

Now, this is an interesting point.  I think if one combines this
argument with Steve's point that a certain baseline of mandatory
algorithms should be required _only_ because you need some common set
for interoperability, one has a pretty good argument that most
algorithms should be MAYs and not stronger.

Thanks,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.