[secdir] Re: Secdir early review of draft-pignataro-eimpact-icmp-02

Carlos Pignataro <cpignata@gmail.com> Sat, 18 May 2024 17:51 UTC

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From: Carlos Pignataro <cpignata@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 12:51:23 -0500
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To: Michael Welzl <michawe@ifi.uio.no>
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Subject: [secdir] Re: Secdir early review of draft-pignataro-eimpact-icmp-02
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Thanks Shawn and Michael!

I’d say, Shawn, "very few to none", and devices would share power (not voltage). 

Based on this discussion, would it then be fair to acknowledge the potential, and say that there’s ongoing research without providing any 2119 guidance?

Like:

“High-fidelity reporting of power draw for the targeted node's memory, cache, or other component could allow an attacker to perform a remote side-channel attack (i.e., using DPA) during cryptographic operations in order to extract the associated secret key. This is an area of ongoing research and as such scope and countermeasures being researched. That said, this document provides a single power value, not a time series. Concerned vendors could introduce noise in the reported measure, concerned operators could have operational policies matching their requirements. “

What do you think? Feel free to edit ✍️ 😊 


Thanks!

Thumb typed by Carlos Pignataro.
Excuze typofraphicak errows

On May 17, 2024, at 00:38, Michael Welzl <michawe@ifi.uio.no> wrote:

Hi all !

Just a thought: a router or switch may not itself be much involved in crypto operations (in the absence of IPSec, and while no encrypted management protocol is in use). In such situations, DPA may be a non-problem.

Devices can of course abstain from sharing power information. What if the security considerations section said that devices should allow their owner to configure if they should share this information while cryptographic operations are active?
( I say “allow their owner to configure” because there may be more concerns about sharing power information widely, so anyway an administrator may want to configure the device to share this information only within a certain network domain. )

Cheers,
Michael


On May 17, 2024, at 7:16 AM, Shawn M Emery <shawn.emery@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Carlos,

Comments begin with SME.

On 5/12/24 4:41 PM, Carlos Pignataro wrote:
Hi 👋🏼 Shawn,

Many thanks for this very useful review!!! Very useful!
SME: Of course.
We have been thinking about your review comments, tracked at
https://github.com/cpignata/eimpact-icmp/issues/27" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow">https://github.com/cpignata/eimpact-icmp/issues/27 , and have some follow up questions for you (leaving only the relevant part of the review)

1. For DPA (as in differential power analysis), an attacker would need a “continuous” Current / Power over time curve while the crypto algo is executed. Would the fact that this is getting a single value (not a time series) be a fair high level counter measure?
SME: This countermeasure is still susceptible to divide-and-conquer attacks, where different parts of the secret key are learned over time.
2. Do these elements typically have DPA protection as in injecting noise? Should we in the results?
SME: Ideally yes, but this depends on individual component/system/software design and therefore could not assume one way or the other that this type of mitigation has been employed on any given device.
3. Could you please share a reference to DPA we could use to add text? And really welcome textual suggestions!!! 😉

SME: Hmmm, this is an area of ongoing research, where promising countermeasures include a holistic approach, such as software flagging sensitive data for the hardware to treat this data with algorithmic noise, i.e., undifferentiated power consumption based on input.  So if this type of mitigation was a MUST in this draft then how many network nodes could currently meet this requirement?  If that answer is "very few to none" then this draft, IMO, would not be an appropriate source to provide guidance on how to counter remote side-channels attacks.  What is the granularity of voltage that would be meaningful as a sustainability metric?

Thanks again, Shawn!

SME: NP

Regards,

Shawn.

--

On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 18:49 Shawn Emery via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
Reviewer: Shawn Emery
Review result: Has Issues
[…]

However, one attack vector that I could
think of is a high-fidelity reporting of power draw for the targeted node's
memory, cache, or HSM component then an attacker could perform a remote
side-channel attack (i.e., using DPA) during cryptographic operations in order
to extract the associated secret key.

General comments:

Thank you for the use-case section.

Editorial comments:

None.