[secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-dmarc-interoperability

[Sean Turner <[e-mail]>]

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

This informational draft describes interoperability issues between DMARC and indirect email flows as well as possible methods for addressing these interoperability issues.  Indirect email flows are messages that do not flow directly from the author's administrative domain to the final recipient(s).

Summary: I think it’s ready, but just wanted to check on one thing.  The difference between the following sentences in s1 and s4:

s1:  Note that some practices which are in use at the time of this document may or may not be "best practices", especially as future standards evolve.

s4: Note that these particular mechanisms may not be considered "best practices" and may, in some cases, violate various conventions or expectations.

made me wonder whether the two identified sections in the security considerations are the only sections that contain text that "violates various conventions or exceptions".  I don’t want wanting to grind the security axe on eMail, DKIM, SPF only on what’s changed.


Ramblings follow:

Rave:

Appreciate that this wasn’t trying to be passed off as a BCP and that there’s no 2119-language.

Appreciate your examples using TLS1.2 and at-this-time-known-to-be-good algorithms.

Rant:

s1 2nd para could probably be deleted.  It sounds a lot like marketing to me :)

Nits:

I found some.  Peter found way more so look for his GenArt review.

spt