Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Re: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)

["Susan Hares" <[e-mail]>]

Catherine:

An attacker with access to a trusted BGP router at the right point in the
network could cause this problem.  I suggest you discuss this point with
Sandy Murphy who has listen to operators on these issues and can speak
"security"  dialect. 

This is for your general information.  See Adrian solution for the right
viewpoint.

Sue 

-----Original Message-----
From: Catherine A Meadows [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2012 12:29 PM
To: Susan Hares
Cc: Catherine A Meadows; [e-mail]; John G. Scudder;
[e-mail]; [e-mail]; Murphy, Sandra;
[e-mail]; [e-mail]; Catherine Meadows;
[e-mail]
Subject: Spam:*******, Re: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of
draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)

Hi  Susan:

My apologies for not responding earlier.  I had been away from my email
while traveling.

My question was not so much intended to recommend specific wording.  It was
simply that I didn't understand what "misconfiguration" meant in this
context, because it isn't the usual terminology used in IETF documents.  But
as I understand it from the discussion,  configurations are not really part
of the standard, so we can't mandate them, and because of that, this is to
be downgraded to a recommendation, as well as
being removed from the security consideration section.   So that answers my
question.


As I understand from the discussion, the security risk of looping only is an
issue if an attacker can cause it to happen, in which case it can be used in
a DOS attack.  So if there is no way an attacker could cause this looping to
happen, I'm happy to have it removed from the Security Considerations
section.  Otherwise, I'd recommend you refer to it in the Security
Considerations section (even if it is described in detail in another
section).  

As to my other question, if there is no straightforward answer to it,
there's no reason to discuss it in the document.

Hope this helps,

Cathy




On Jul 17, 2012, at 12:03 PM, Stewart Bryant wrote:

> It seems like a good suggestion to me
> 
> Stewart
> 
> On 17/07/2012 16:47, Susan Hares wrote:
>> Adrian:
>> 
>> 100% agree with your viewpoint and next steps.
>> 
>> John and Stuart - can we change to this view point.
>> 
>> Sue
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Adrian Farrel [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2012 11:44 AM
>> To: 'Susan Hares'; 'John G. Scudder'; [e-mail]
>> Cc: [e-mail]; 'Murphy, Sandra'; [e-mail]; 
>> [e-mail]; 'Catherine Meadows'; 
>> [e-mail]
>> Subject: RE: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of 
>> draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
>> 
>> IMHO, you are right Sue. Stating "MUST NOT" in a specification does 
>> not prevent something from happening.
>> Using "MUST NOT" for a specification is fine because we can test for 
>> conformance to that and strike an implementation that does not 
>> respect the language.
>> Using "MUST NOT" in a description of an operator process is not as 
>> strong or useful.
>> 
>> I think that "weakening" loop detection is a bad thing, but it is 
>> also a price an operator might want to pay to get moved to 4byte AS 
>> numbers quickly when a few corner boxes might take another 12 months to
be upgraded.
>> 
>> I agree with John that the text is not security-related.
>> 
>> So, I would rephrase and reposition the text.
>> - Do explain the risk of switching to 4bytes before everyone is upgraded.
>> - Do explain the boundaries to the risk
>> - Do expect operators to consider the implications
>> - Don't mandate what an operator does in the privacy of their own 
>> bedroom
>> 
>> A
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf 
>>> Of Susan Hares
>>> Sent: 17 July 2012 16:34
>>> To: 'John G. Scudder'; [e-mail]
>>> Cc: [e-mail]; 'Murphy, Sandra'; [e-mail];
>> [e-mail];
>>> 'Catherine Meadows'; [e-mail]
>>> Subject: RE: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of
>>> draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07
>> (resend
>>> of a resend)
>>> 
>>> John and Stuart:
>>> 
>>> This an acceptable text, and we can go on with this draft.
>>> 
>>> However,  my question to Catherine was substantive.  I wish to 
>>> discuss with the Routing AD(s), Security people, and Benoit/Ron to 
>>> understand the Routing/Operational issues.
>>> 
>>> "Must Not" configure is unrealistic.  People misconfigure. Yankee 
>>> Group and other research houses places have indicated year-on-year 
>>> 15-30% outages are caused by this misconfigured.  It's like the 
>>> statement
>> "stuff happens."
>>> Stating "Must not" is like spitting into the wind.  You end up with 
>>> stuff on your face.  What is the security area stating?  How does 
>>> this review match with the path validation/security in SIDR.
>>> 
>>> Can we get Catherine or other security people to respond to my question?
>>> Cross-area review is useful to find wholes in our process and our 
>>> assumptions.  I want to make sure I understand the valuable 
>>> technical feedback the security review is providing.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sue
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: John G. Scudder [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2012 10:38 AM
>>> To: [e-mail]
>>> Cc: [e-mail]; 'Catherine Meadows'; [e-mail]; 
>>> [e-mail]; [e-mail];
>>> 'Murphy, Sandra'
>>> Subject: Re: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of
>>> draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
>>> 
>>> Stewart,
>>> 
>>> I'm fine with the text you propose.
>>> 
>>> (I do find it a little odd to have this text -- either old or new -- 
>>> in the Security section since routing loops aren't normally though 
>>> of as a security issue unless maliciously triggered -- which this 
>>> one isn't described as being. So I would also be fine with changing 
>>> the text but moving it to a different section. But that is 
>>> quibbling.)
>>> 
>>> --John
>>> 
>>> On Jul 17, 2012, at 12:24 AM, Stewart Bryant wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Sue, John,
>>>> 
>>>> Is there any reason not to reword the text concerned to more 
>>>> conventional format:
>>>> 
>>>> OLD
>>>> It is a misconfiguration to assign a non-mappable four-octet AS
>>>>    number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all
>>>>    the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to
>>>>    support four-octet AS numbers.  Such a misconfiguration would weaken
>>>>    the AS path loop detection within a confederation.
>>>> 
>>>> NEW
>>>> 
>>>> A network operator MUST NOT assign a non-mappable four-octet AS 
>>>> number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all 
>>>> the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to 
>>>> support four-octet AS numbers, as such an assignment would weaken 
>>>> the AS path loop detection within a confederation.
>>>> 
>>>> Stewart
>>>> 
>>>> On 17/07/2012 00:28, Susan Hares wrote:
>>>>> Catherine:
>>>>> 
>>>>> I've read and re-read this email for a week (7/9 - 7/16).
>>>>> 
>>>>> Misconfiguration is a fact of life in networks.  Security profiles 
>>>>> must
>>> deal with this point.  We can all say you should not misconfigure 
>>> networks - but life happens.  Therefore,  I'm confused by your 
>>> question.  I would consider it is just a security event the authors
>> pointing happens.
>>>>> On your second comment
>>>>> 
>>>>> "I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out 
>>>>> conversion from 4-octet to 2-octet occurring between 
>>>>> confederations would be much less than of their occurring within a 
>>>>> confederation (although one can't know for sure without knowing 
>>>>> what the 4-octet to 2-octet mapping is), so following the 
>>>>> recommendations in the Security Considerations would greatly 
>>>>> reduce the probability of such a routing loop occurring.  Is this
correct? "
>>>>> 
>>>>> It depends if someone configures a confederation within a
>> confederation.
>>> [see earlier comment on mis-configuration.] I've copied Sandy Murphy 
>>> in case as SIDR chair can put this discussion into a different 
>>> "security" specific light.
>>>>> Confused,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Sue
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> From: Catherine Meadows [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 2:25 PM
>>>>> To: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; 
>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>> Cc: Catherine Meadows
>>>>> Subject: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of
>>>>> draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
>>>>> 
>>>>> I managed to screw up the email address again.  Here it is for 
>>>>> what I
>>> hope is the last time.
>>>>> My apologies again to everyone who receives *three* copies of this
>>> message.
>>>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security 
>>>>> directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being 
>>>>> processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for 
>>>>> the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and 
>>>>> WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call
comments.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This document describes an added capability for four-octet 
>>>>> Autonomous System
>>>>> (AS) numbers in BGP.  This is intended to  replace the older 
>>>>> two-octet AS numbers, since that space is filling up.
>>>>> 
>>>>> In order to preserve backward compatibility, AS's using the 
>>>>> four-octet systems (called New BGP speakers in the document) must
>>> advertise both four-octet and two-octet AS numbers.
>>>>> This is the case even if the New BGP Speaker does not have a 
>>>>> globally
>>> unique two-octet number.
>>>>> The document says that in this case the two-octet number is 
>>>>> obtained by mapping the four-octet number to the two-octet space.
>>>>> The procedure
>>> for doing this is not specified.
>>>>> The authors identify a risk of routing loops developing when 
>>>>> ambiguities develops as a result of a BGP speaker using the old 
>>>>> system aggregating two or more routes carrying 4-octet attributes.
>>>>> In the Security Configurations Section, the authors point out that 
>>>>> an attacker might be able to exploit this in a denial of service
>> attack.
>>>>> They point out that it is a misconfiguration to assign 4-octet 
>>>>> Member AS
>>> Numbers in a BGP confederation until all BGP speakers within the 
>>> confederation have transitioned to support 4-octet numbers.
>>>>> I think that this is a good recommendation.  I just have a couple 
>>>>> of
>>> minor comments.
>>>>> It's not clear to me what the status of "misconfiguration" is in 
>>>>> the
>>> hierarchy of IETF.
>>>>> Is it more like SHALL NOT or SHOULD NOT?  Is there a reason why 
>>>>> you're saying "misconfiguration" instead of one of those?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out 
>>>>> conversion from 4-octet to 2-octet occurring between 
>>>>> confederations would be much less than of their occurring within a 
>>>>> confederation (although one can't know for sure without knowing 
>>>>> what the 4-octet to 2-octet mapping is), so following the 
>>>>> recommendations in the Security
>>> Considerations would greatly reduce the probability of such a 
>>> routing loop occurring.  Is this correct?
>>>>> Cathy Meadows
>>>>> Catherine Meadows
>>>>> Naval Research Laboratory
>>>>> Code 5543
>>>>> 4555 Overlook Ave., S.W.
>>>>> Washington DC, 20375
>>>>> phone: [phone]
>>>>> fax: [phone]
>>>>> email: [e-mail]
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> For corporate legal information go to:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> http://www.cisco.com/web/about/doing_business/legal/cri/index.html
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> .
>> 
> 
> 
> --
> For corporate legal information go to:
> 
> http://www.cisco.com/web/about/doing_business/legal/cri/index.html