[secdir] Review of draft-ietf-straw-b2bua-dtls-srtp

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Fri, 20 November 2015 02:35 UTC

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Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 21:35:09 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, iesg@ietf.org, draft-ietf-straw-b2bua-dtls-srtp.all@tools.ietf.org
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Subject: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-straw-b2bua-dtls-srtp
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

As far as I understood the document and its dependancies (I'm not very
familiar with the sip/srtp world), the document is Ready.

One minor nit: Section 1.2 has a broken link for RFC-7092.

This document describes how a "middle man" relaying connections between
two sip endpoints should behave so it will not break the connection
between the sip endpoints. The security section clearly lists the
defenses the sip endpoints should take to ensure this "middle man" is
not maliciously decrypting/re-encrypting the content of the connection
it forwards between the endpoints.