[secdir] 答复: Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01

"Xialiang (Frank)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> Thu, 02 July 2015 02:08 UTC

Return-Path: <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
X-Original-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com []) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 172071A0013; Wed, 1 Jul 2015 19:08:12 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: 1.74
X-Spam-Level: *
X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.74 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, CHARSET_FARAWAY_HEADER=3.2, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, MIME_CHARSET_FARAWAY=2.45, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hQ7DhHcO9U8a; Wed, 1 Jul 2015 19:08:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from lhrrgout.huawei.com (lhrrgout.huawei.com []) (using TLSv1 with cipher RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B708A1A000A; Wed, 1 Jul 2015 19:08:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from (EHLO lhreml402-hub.china.huawei.com) ([]) by lhrrg01-dlp.huawei.com (MOS 4.3.7-GA FastPath queued) with ESMTP id BYF71725; Thu, 02 Jul 2015 02:08:03 +0000 (GMT)
Received: from SZXEMA414-HUB.china.huawei.com ( by lhreml402-hub.china.huawei.com ( with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id; Thu, 2 Jul 2015 03:07:59 +0100
Received: from SZXEMA502-MBS.china.huawei.com ([]) by SZXEMA414-HUB.china.huawei.com ([]) with mapi id 14.03.0158.001; Thu, 2 Jul 2015 10:07:55 +0800
From: "Xialiang (Frank)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
To: Sarah Banks <sbanks@encrypted.net>, "Fernando Calabria (fcalabri)" <fcalabri@cisco.com>
Thread-Topic: Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01
Thread-Index: AdCznVhNjRYm7y6ZS9SgpDHakbeZ2QAWCOBAAAQtUQD//7clgP/+/KZQ
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2015 02:07:54 +0000
Message-ID: <C02846B1344F344EB4FAA6FA7AF481F12ADE739F@SZXEMA502-MBS.china.huawei.com>
References: <C02846B1344F344EB4FAA6FA7AF481F12ADE7046@SZXEMA502-MBS.china.huawei.com> <4AF73AA205019A4C8A1DDD32C034631D0662C6E4BD@NJFPSRVEXG0.research.att.com> <D1B950B6.49F87%fcalabri@cisco.com> <9E32EDE7-875D-400C-BC45-806C854C3AAB@encrypted.net>
In-Reply-To: <9E32EDE7-875D-400C-BC45-806C854C3AAB@encrypted.net>
Accept-Language: zh-CN, en-US
Content-Language: zh-CN
x-originating-ip: []
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_C02846B1344F344EB4FAA6FA7AF481F12ADE739FSZXEMA502MBSchi_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/sR9mhCt-dhu8R7X_w9yKtSVvmQI>
Cc: "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org>, ALFRED MORTON <acmorton@att.com>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: [secdir] =?gb2312?b?tPC4tDogU2VjZGlyIHJldmlldyBvZiBkcmFmdC1pZXRm?= =?gb2312?b?LWJtd2ctaXNzdS1tZXRoLTAx?=
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdir/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2015 02:08:12 -0000

Hi authors,
Thank you for the detailed feedbacks. It helps me understand your consideration and decision more clear. I think  we all agree with the importance of authenticity and integrity verification for SW package.
Since the test method aims to mimic the real network application, and the complexity and risks of real network will cause the  unverified SW package quite possible, so I suggest to consider the related test steps.
Of course, you can make the test steps to be optional, not mandatory, due to the reality.

Anyway, it’s just my suggestion, you can decide by your own.


发件人: Sarah Banks [mailto:sbanks@encrypted.net]
发送时间: 2015年7月2日 1:39
收件人: Fernando Calabria (fcalabri)
抄送: ALFRED MORTON; Xialiang (Frank); secdir@ietf.org; iesg@ietf.org; draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org
主题: Re: Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01

Hi Frank,
       Thanks for your review! To add to what Fernando discussed below, for your points 2 and 3, we came to this conclusion not only because vendors don't have consistency in implementation, but also because customers with that running code weren't asking for it either. Often, they're downloading the code via login from the vendors' site - this doesn't mitigate your points, but it sheds some light on why perhaps they're not as concerned about it. I echo Fer's thoughts though, that we feel it's as covered as it could be with the section of the draft he quotes below - that the operator performing the ISSU should ensure the veracity of the code before installing it.

       Finally, I too share Al's thought, that a DDOS wouldn't likely be underway before an ISSU starts. A DDOS could, in theory, start after the ISSU starts, but then, any number of corner cases could occur when an ISSU starts, and that part might be a whole new draft. :) IMHO this is unlikely, and I'm not moved to cover it in the draft, however, if you have suggestions, we're willing to review them.


On Jul 1, 2015, at 5:59 AM, Fernando Calabria (fcalabri) <fcalabri@cisco.com<mailto:fcalabri@cisco.com>> wrote:

Thank you Frank for your review and Al for addressing # 1 and # 4 ..

In regards to # 2 and #3

We also saw and considered how  verifications like the authenticity of a SW package may be a concern , even more,   nowadays,  with emerging SDN  like implementations ,

Unfortunately   not all the vendors nor even software specific operating systems  within vendors,  have “consistent  implementations" of  Digital Signatures nor  Certificates and do not make these checks a mandatory task  before performing a Software upgrade.

Because of it  we tried to address it with a ‘generic’ statement on Sections 3.1 and 3.2 that basically read:

"Internal compatibility
   verification may be performed by the software running on the DUT, to
   verify the checksum of the files downloaded as well as any other
   pertinent checks. Depending upon vendor implementation, these
   mechanisms may extend to include verification that the downloaded
   module(s) …"


Internal compatibility verification may be
   performed by the software running on the DUT, as part of the upgrade
   process itself, to verify the checksum of the files downloaded as
   well as any other pertinent checks….

The authors of this document understand  how these are real issues / concerns on managing an operating a  Software   environment, ,  but we do not believe that an specific ISSU  document should addresses them in  detail


From: <MORTON>, "ALFRED C (AL)" <acmorton@att.com<mailto:acmorton@att.com>>
Date: Wednesday, July 1, 2015 at 8:08 AM
To: "Xialiang (Frank)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com<mailto:frank.xialiang@huawei.com>>, "secdir@ietf.org<mailto:secdir@ietf.org>" <secdir@ietf.org<mailto:secdir@ietf.org>>, "iesg@ietf.org<mailto:iesg@ietf.org>" <iesg@ietf.org<mailto:iesg@ietf.org>>, "draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org>" <draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org>>
Subject: RE: Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01

Hi Frank,
Thanks for your review and comments.

On #1, DoS attacks: since human control is involved here,
it seems unlikely that operators will begin an upgrade
during a DoS attack when they know it’s in-progress, IMO.
Others should chime-in if they have other rationale or opinions.

On #4, That’s the draft date, not the expiration date.
see below,
doc shepherd

Benchmarking Working Group                                  Sarah Banks
Internet Draft                                           VSS Monitoring
Intended status: Informational                        Fernando Calabria
Expires: November 30, 2015                                Cisco Systems
                                                           Gery Czirjak
                                                          Ramdas Machat
                                                       Juniper Networks
                                                           May 30, 2015

ISSU Benchmarking Methodology

From: Xialiang (Frank) [mailto:frank.xialiang@huawei.com]
Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2015 9:29 PM
To: secdir@ietf.org<mailto:secdir@ietf.org>; iesg@ietf.org<mailto:iesg@ietf.org>; draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org<mailto:draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org>
Subject: Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comment.

This draft specifies a set of common methodologies and procedures designed to characterize the overall behavior of a Device Under Test (DUT), subject to an ISSU event.

I have the following comments:
1.       Should the ISSU test methodology include the verification and test when the DUT is under network DDoS attacks?
2.       In the software download stage, in addition to compatibility checks and verification of checksums, we should also explicitly mention that the device should verify the authenticity and integrity of its download. I.e. verify signatures on signed code and OCSP/CRL for the used signature. And that a system must not load unverified code;
3.       even in a test environment all deployed software components must be verified (e.g. using signatures);
4.       Nits: this draft has expired on May-30, 2015

Recommendation:  Ready With Issues