Re: [secdir] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-siprec-architecture-08

["Hutton, Andrew" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Derek,

I am ok with putting something in the security considerations to say the key management requirements for storage and retrieval is something that the recording system will need to consider but I would still say that saying anything more than that is out of scope.

What do others think?

Andy


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Derek Atkins [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: 24 October 2013 15:53
> To: Hutton, Andrew
> Cc: Derek Atkins; [e-mail]; [e-mail]; siprec-
> [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail];
> [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: sec-dir review of draft-ietf-siprec-architecture-08
> 
> Hi Andrew,
> 
> Sorry for the delay in responding.
> 
> I personally feel that there is a big difference between the
> interactive, real-time SIP components versus a service that is
> specifically designed to record and replay content later.  The key
> management of the real-time components is all immediate, there is no
> storage required, once the keys get to the endpoints you're done and
> all
> you do is transmit encrypted content.
> 
> However a storage system has significantly different requirements.  It
> has to store the keys that protect the content, and it must store those
> keys securely.  It then has to be able to securely distribute those
> keys
> only to authorized receipients.
> 
> So yes, I think it is important to talk about at least the requirements
> for what the recording agent MUST do, even if you don't necessarily
> specify HOW the agent must do it.  E.g. I think it's okay to say
> something like "the stored content must be protected using a cipher at
> least as strong (or stronger) than the original content" -- i.e., you
> don't need to specify "you MUST use AES-256".  Yet I still think you
> need to talk about the key management requirements of the storage (and
> more importantly retrieval).
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> -derek
> 
> "Hutton, Andrew" <[e-mail]> writes:
> 
> > Hi Derek,
> >
> > Thanks for your comment and sorry for taking a while to get back to
> you.
> >
> > The security considerations section contains the following text:
> >
> > " It is the responsibility of the Session Recording Server to protect
> >    the Replicated Media and Recording Metadata once it has been
> received
> >    and archived.  The mechanism for protecting the storage and
> retrieval
> >    from the SRS is out of scope of this work."
> >
> >
> > Personally I think this is reasonable as we never say anything in SIP
> > related specifications what a UA should do with the media once it has
> > been received and this work is all about delivering the media and
> > related metadata to the recording system not what it does with it
> > afterwards.
> >
> > Is it really necessary to go any further than this?
> >
> > Regards
> > Andy (SIPREC Co-Chair).
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Derek Atkins [mailto:[e-mail]]
> >> Sent: 01 October 2013 16:34
> >> To: [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> >> Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
> >> [e-mail]; [e-mail]; Hutton, Andrew
> >> Subject: sec-dir review of draft-ietf-siprec-architecture-08
> >>
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> >> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
> >> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
> >> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should
> treat
> >> these comments just like any other last call comments.
> >>
> >>    Session recording is a critical requirement in many
> communications
> >>    environments such as call centers and financial trading.  In some
> of
> >>    these environments, all calls must be recorded for regulatory,
> >>    compliance, and consumer protection reasons.  Recording of a
> session
> >>    is typically performed by sending a copy of a media stream to a
> >>    recording device.  This document describes architectures for
> >>    deploying session recording solutions in an environment which is
> >>    based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).
> >>
> >> Retrieving recorded media is a potential Key Management problem
> which
> >> this document completely ignores (and even claims is out of scope).
> >> The key used to encrypt the recorded media (whether or not the media
> >> is re-encrypted) must be stored and retrieved as part of the media
> >> retrieval.  How this important data is stored and retrieved is left
> >> out, leaving an implementation with no guidance on how to protect
> that
> >> valuable asset.  In fact the document completely elides the question
> >> of how a retriever obtains the data encryption key.  Even if it's
> just
> >> additional guidance the Security Considerations should at least
> >> explain the problem even if it doesn't provide a solution.
> >>
> >> -derek
> >>
> >> --
> >>        Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
> >>        [e-mail]             www.ihtfp.com
> >>        Computer and Internet Security Consultant
> >
> >
> 
> --
>        Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
>        [e-mail]             www.ihtfp.com
>        Computer and Internet Security Consultant