Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
"Adrian Farrel" <afarrel@juniper.net> Tue, 17 July 2012 14:43 UTC
Return-Path: <afarrel@juniper.net>
X-Original-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13E0521F86E3; Tue, 17 Jul 2012 07:43:45 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id z87zgBAdA7lb; Tue, 17 Jul 2012 07:43:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from asmtp5.iomartmail.com (asmtp5.iomartmail.com [62.128.201.176]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A49A521F86BB; Tue, 17 Jul 2012 07:43:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from asmtp5.iomartmail.com (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by asmtp5.iomartmail.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id q6HEiRfL009812; Tue, 17 Jul 2012 15:44:27 +0100
Received: from 950129200 (dsl-sp-81-140-15-32.in-addr.broadbandscope.com [81.140.15.32]) (authenticated bits=0) by asmtp5.iomartmail.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id q6HEiOGS009778 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NO); Tue, 17 Jul 2012 15:44:25 +0100
From: Adrian Farrel <afarrel@juniper.net>
To: "'John G. Scudder'" <jgs@juniper.net>, stbryant@cisco.com
References: <9BA4B53E-9772-47D4-B336-3A98FAEB4045@nrl.navy.mil> <005401cd63aa$baeac2b0$30c04810$@ndzh.com> <5005132E.9000000@cisco.com> <F71E3EEE-3082-47F9-961C-7B78EED4A4A6@juniper.net>
In-Reply-To: <F71E3EEE-3082-47F9-961C-7B78EED4A4A6@juniper.net>
Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 15:44:24 +0100
Message-ID: <076b01cd642a$a9de13c0$fd9a3b40$@juniper.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 14.0
Thread-Index: AQJKmuJjwEjeN+Alq24qu8oI3WgY1gDXd0BoAZu+ckcBR6c4qpYVR7ow
Content-Language: en-gb
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, "'Murphy, Sandra'" <Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com>, idr-chairs@tools.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
Reply-To: afarrel@juniper.net
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 14:43:45 -0000
Quibble away. It is what you are paid for. I think you make a good point about the location of the text. A > -----Original Message----- > From: iesg-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:iesg-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John > G. Scudder > Sent: 17 July 2012 15:38 > To: stbryant@cisco.com > Cc: secdir@ietf.org; 'Murphy, Sandra'; idr-chairs@tools.ietf.org; iesg@ietf.org; > 'Catherine Meadows'; draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis.all@tools.ietf.org > Subject: Re: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend > of a resend) > > Stewart, > > I'm fine with the text you propose. > > (I do find it a little odd to have this text -- either old or new -- in the Security > section since routing loops aren't normally though of as a security issue unless > maliciously triggered -- which this one isn't described as being. So I would also be > fine with changing the text but moving it to a different section. But that is > quibbling.) > > --John > > On Jul 17, 2012, at 12:24 AM, Stewart Bryant wrote: > > > Sue, John, > > > > Is there any reason not to reword the text concerned to more > > conventional format: > > > > OLD > > It is a misconfiguration to assign a non-mappable four-octet AS > > number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all > > the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to > > support four-octet AS numbers. Such a misconfiguration would weaken > > the AS path loop detection within a confederation. > > > > NEW > > > > A network operator MUST NOT assign a non-mappable four-octet AS > > number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all > > the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to > > support four-octet AS numbers, as such an assignment would weaken > > the AS path loop detection within a confederation. > > > > Stewart > > > > On 17/07/2012 00:28, Susan Hares wrote: > >> Catherine: > >> > >> I've read and re-read this email for a week (7/9 - 7/16). > >> > >> Misconfiguration is a fact of life in networks. Security profiles must deal with > this point. We can all say you should not misconfigure networks - but life > happens. Therefore, I'm confused by your question. I would consider it is just a > security event the authors pointing happens. > >> > >> On your second comment > >> > >> "I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out conversion > from 4-octet > >> to 2-octet occurring between confederations would be much less than of their > occurring > >> within a confederation (although one can't know for sure without knowing > what the 4-octet > >> to 2-octet mapping is), so following the recommendations in the Security > Considerations would > >> greatly reduce the probability of such a routing loop occurring. Is this correct? > " > >> > >> It depends if someone configures a confederation within a confederation. > [see earlier comment on mis-configuration.] I've copied Sandy Murphy in case as > SIDR chair can put this discussion into a different "security" specific light. > >> > >> Confused, > >> > >> Sue > >> > >> > >> From: Catherine Meadows [mailto:catherine.meadows@nrl.navy.mil] > >> Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 2:25 PM > >> To: iesg@ietf.org; secdir@ietf.org; draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis.all@tools.ietf.org > >> Cc: Catherine Meadows > >> Subject: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend > of a resend) > >> > >> I managed to screw up the email address again. Here it is for what I hope is > the last time. > >> My apologies again to everyone who receives *three* copies of this message. > >> > >> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's > >> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the > >> IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the > >> security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat > >> these comments just like any other last call comments. > >> > >> This document describes an added capability for four-octet Autonomous > System > >> (AS) numbers in BGP. This is intended to replace the older two-octet AS > numbers, > >> since that space is filling up. > >> > >> In order to preserve backward compatibility, AS's using the four-octet systems > (called New > >> BGP speakers in the document) must advertise both four-octet and two-octet > AS numbers. > >> This is the case even if the New BGP Speaker does not have a globally unique > two-octet number. > >> The document says that in this case the two-octet number is obtained by > mapping the four-octet > >> number to the two-octet space. The procedure for doing this is not specified. > >> > >> The authors identify a risk of routing loops developing when ambiguities > develops as a > >> result of a BGP speaker using the old system aggregating two or more routes > carrying > >> 4-octet attributes. In the Security Configurations Section, the authors point > out that an > >> attacker might be able to exploit this in a denial of service attack. They point > out that it is > >> a misconfiguration to assign 4-octet Member AS Numbers in a BGP > confederation until all BGP speakers > >> within the confederation have transitioned to support 4-octet numbers. > >> > >> I think that this is a good recommendation. I just have a couple of minor > comments. > >> > >> It's not clear to me what the status of "misconfiguration" is in the hierarchy of > IETF. > >> Is it more like SHALL NOT or SHOULD NOT? Is there a reason why you're > saying > >> "misconfiguration" instead of one of those? > >> > >> I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out conversion > from 4-octet > >> to 2-octet occurring between confederations would be much less than of their > occurring > >> within a confederation (although one can't know for sure without knowing > what the 4-octet > >> to 2-octet mapping is), so following the recommendations in the Security > Considerations would > >> greatly reduce the probability of such a routing loop occurring. Is this correct? > >> > >> Cathy Meadows > >> Catherine Meadows > >> Naval Research Laboratory > >> Code 5543 > >> 4555 Overlook Ave., S.W. > >> Washington DC, 20375 > >> phone: 202-767-3490 > >> fax: 202-404-7942 > >> email: catherine.meadows@nrl.navy.mil > >> > > > > > > -- > > For corporate legal information go to: > > > > > > http://www.cisco.com/web/about/doing_business/legal/cri/index.html > > > > > >
- [secdir] Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893b… Catherine Meadows
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Susan Hares
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Stewart Bryant
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… John G. Scudder
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Adrian Farrel
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Adrian Farrel
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Susan Hares
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Susan Hares
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Susan Hares
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Stewart Bryant
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Catherine A Meadows
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Re: Spam:*******, Secd… Susan Hares
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… John G. Scudder
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Murphy, Sandra
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Susan Hares
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… John G. Scudder
- Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft… Susan Hares