Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-pcp-base
"Dan Wing" <dwing@cisco.com> Wed, 14 March 2012 01:07 UTC
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From: Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
To: 'Dan Harkins' <dharkins@lounge.org>, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-pcp-base.all@tools.ietf.org
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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 18:07:56 -0700
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Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-pcp-base
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> -----Original Message----- > From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org] > Sent: Wednesday, February 29, 2012 11:46 AM > To: iesg@ietf.org; secdir@ietf.org; draft-ietf-pcp- > base.all@tools.ietf.org > Subject: secdir review of draft-ietf-pcp-base > > > My apologies for the tardiness of this review. The tracker says > it's on the agenda for the next telechat so maybe this isn't completely > useless. > > I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's > ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the > IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the > security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat > these comments just like any other last call comments. > > This draft describes a simple request/response protocol to create > and manage mappings on upstream devices (like NATs) to control how > incoming packets get forwarded. It defines two threat models (a simple > one and an advanced one) that seem reasonable for the different use > cases. The Security Considerations are well-written and address all > attacks I could think of. The draft is very well-written and complete. > > PCP has a THIRD_PARTY option in which a PCP client can create a > mapping on a PCP server for a different device. This has the potential > for abuse. The implications of this option are mentioned somewhat in > passing in the section that describes the option ("Determining which > PCP > clients are authorized to use the THIRD_PARTY Option for which other > hosts is deployment-dependent....A cryptographic authentication and > authorization model is outside the scope of this specification") but > it would be nice if they were addressed a bit more in the Security > Considerations section. It would be nice to see mention of: > > a) what capabilities should a PCP server have to properly address > authorization of requests that include the THIRD_PARTY option; > and, > b) what are the implications of enabling the THIRD_PARTY option on a > PCP server? In other words, what does a user need to understand > before he enables it? In -24, I added the following new paragraph to the THIRD_PARTY section. It doesn't fully answer your point, but provides some guidance to when and where THIRD_PARTY is intended to be used: A management device would use this Option to control a PCP server on behalf of users. For example, a management device located in a network operations center, which presents a user interface to end users or to network operations staff, and issues PCP requests with the THIRD_PARTY option to the appropriate PCP server. > I understand that this is a very tardy request, my apologies again, so > I understand if this comment is not resolved. -d