Re: [secdir] SECDIR Review draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-05

mohamed.boucadair@orange.com Thu, 27 May 2021 12:48 UTC

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From: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
CC: "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "last-call@ietf.org" <last-call@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis.all@ietf.org>, secdir <secdir@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: SECDIR Review draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-05
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Date: Thu, 27 May 2021 12:48:26 +0000
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Subject: Re: [secdir] SECDIR Review draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-05
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Hi Ben, Donald, 

I think this is now fixed in: 

https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-06&url2=draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-07 

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:kaduk@mit.edu]
> Envoyé : jeudi 27 mai 2021 06:43
> À : Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
> Cc : BOUCADAIR Mohamed TGI/OLN <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>;
> iesg@ietf.org; last-call@ietf.org; draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-
> bis.all@ietf.org; secdir <secdir@ietf.org>
> Objet : Re: SECDIR Review draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-05
> 
> Hi Donald,
> 
> First off, thanks for the review, and thanks to Med for the updates
> in response.  Continuing inline...
> 
> On Sat, Mar 27, 2021 at 11:42:56PM -0400, Donald Eastlake wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Thanks for adopting so many of my suggestions.
> >
> > See below where I have trimmed to points where we disagree that I
> > think I have something to add.
> >
> > On Tue, Mar 23, 2021 at 9:51 AM <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
> wrote:
> > > Hi Donald,
> > >
> > >...
> > >
> > > De : Donald Eastlake [mailto:d3e3e3@gmail.com] Envoyé : mardi 23
> > > mars 2021 05:53 À : iesg@ietf.org; last-call@ietf.org Cc :
> > > draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis.all@ietf.org; secdir
> <secdir@ietf.org>
> > > Objet : SECDIR Review draft-ietf-dots-rfc8782-bis-05
> > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > Minor Issues / Nits:
> > >
> > >...
> > >
> > > General/Global: All six occurrences of "as a reminder" should be
> > > deleted from the draft. They just add useless words.
> > >
> > > [Med] Except the one about IPv4/IPv6, those were added to address
> comments that we received in the past. I prefer to maintain them.
> >
> > Perhaps I was not clear. I have no problem with the substantive
> > material you have included AFTER the words "as a reminder,". I was
> > mearly suggesting that the literal three word sequence "as a
> reminder"
> > is three superfluous words that should be removed.
> 
> Thanks for reiterating the intent of the suggestion.
> I think I am okay leaving them in for now, and seeing if the rest of
> the IESG has an opinion.
> 
> > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > Section 4.4.1:
> > >
> > > The following draft text uses "the trailing "=" " which implies
> that
> > > a base 64 encoding ends with exactly one equal sign. But I
> believe
> > > there can be zero, one, or two equal signs. I suggest the
> following:
> > > OLD
> > >          The truncated output is
> > >          base64url encoded (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) with the
> trailing
> > >          "=" removed from the encoding, and the resulting value
> used as
> > >          the 'cuid'.
> > > NEW
> > >          The truncated output is
> > >          base64url encoded (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) with any
> trailing
> > >          equal signs ("=") removed from the encoding, and the
> > >          resulting value used as the 'cuid'.
> > >
> > > [Med] We meant “any trailing”. Fixed by updating to “two trailing
> "="”
> >
> > That still seems wrong to me. The initial wording ("the trainling
> > "="") implied exactly one equal sign. The new wording ("the two
> > training "="") implies exactly two equal signs. But there can be
> zero,
> > one, or two. If you mean "any training "="", which would be good,
> why
> > don't you say that (or, alternatively, "all trailing")?
> 
> In this case the quantity in question is always a 16-byte binary
> quantity that's being base64-encoded, so there always will be two
> padding characters to remove.
> 
> > >
> > >...
> > >
> > > Section 7.3: Since the PMTU can change and could be lower that
> the
> > > values suggested to be assumed in the first paragraph of Section
> > > 7.3, it is essentially impossible to conform to the first
> sentence
> > > as written. I suggest the following change:
> > > OLD
> > >    To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent
> > >    decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST
> ensure
> > >    that the DTLS record fits within a single datagram.
> > >
> > > [Med] We are echoing the following from Section 4.1.1 of 6347:
> > >
> > > “Each DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram.”
> >
> > I don't agree that you are "echoing" RFC 6347. If you were, you
> would
> > say
> >
> > "To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent
> > decreased probability of message delivery, the DTLS records MUST
> fit
> > within a single datagram."
> >
> > If you had said that, I would not have complained. It is a true
> > statement of the bad effects DTLS records not fitting in a
> datagram.
> 
> I think I see your point.  Since RFC 6347 already has a "MUST fit"
> requirement, we could just rely on that and avoid using new normative
> language (I think your point is that "MUST ensure" is not something
> that can reliably be achieved, since the DOTS agent may not know
> about MTU changes).  Perhaps we can say something like:
> 
>   To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent
>   decreased probability of message delivery, the DLTS records need to
>   fit within a single datagram [RFC6347].
> 
> 
> > > NEW
> > >    To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent
> > >    decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST
> NOT
> > >    send datagrams exceeding the limits discussed in this Section.
> > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > The way this sentence talks about moving around "mitigation
> efficacy"
> > > reads very strangely to me. I suggest the following re-wording:
> > > OLD
> > >    A compromised DOTS client can collude with a DDoS attacker to
> send
> > >    mitigation request for a target resource, get the mitigation
> efficacy
> > >    from the DOTS server, and convey the mitigation efficacy to
> the DDoS
> > >    attacker to possibly change the DDoS attack strategy.
> > > NEW
> > >    A compromised DOTS client can be commanded by a DDoS attacker
> to
> > >    abuse mitigation requests for a target resource. This could
> use the
> > >    "mitigation" abilities of the DOTS server for the benefit of
> the
> > >    attacker possibly leading to a changed and more effective DDoS
> > >    attack strategy.
> > >
> > > [Med] Thanks. I prefer the OLD wording.
> >
> > I think I understand what you mean by "efficacy" more clearly now
> but
> > I still think you should fix the grammar by changing "request" in
> the
> > 2nd line to "requests" (or, if you really mean this to be singular,
> > change the wording to "a mitigation request").
> 
> (I think it's supposed to be singular.  Yes, there's a cardinality
> mismatch.)
> 
> Thanks again,
> 
> Ben

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