Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml

Alejandro Pérez Méndez <alex@um.es> Mon, 14 December 2015 12:46 UTC

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To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, secdir <secdir@ietf.org>
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Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 13:46:35 +0100
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Cc: Josh.Howlett@ja.net, hartmans-ietf@mit.edu
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml
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Hi Paul,

thanks for the review. Please, see my comments inline.


El 14/12/15 a las 04:57, Paul Hoffman escribió:
> Greetings. I'm the SecDir reviewer for draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml. I 
> apologize for the lateness of this review, particularly because I have 
> what might be a significant question on the draft.
>
> The first two paragraphs of the Security Considerations section read:
>
>    In this specification, the Relying Party MUST trust any statement in
>    the SAML messages from the IdP in the same way that it trusts
>    information contained in RADIUS attributes.  These entities MUST
>    trust the RADIUS infrastructure to provide integrity of the SAML
>    messages.
>
>    Furthermore, the Relying Party MUST apply policy and filter the
>    information based on what information the IdP is permitted to assert
>    and on what trust is reasonable to place in proxies between them.
>
> These seem like pretty important considerations. I fully admit that I 
> might have missed it, but are they actually mentioned earlier in the 
> document? I would have expected them in the Introduction, or at least 
> in Section 7.
>
> If those requirements are not listed early, shouldn't they be?

You are right. We think that restating this consideration (first 
paragraph) at the begging of section 4.2 would be a good idea. Besides, 
it will serve as a better motivation for why using RADIUS over TLS (or 
equivalent security means) is mandatory.

Would that work for you?

Regards,
Alejandro

>
> --Paul Hoffman