Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis-12

Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> Mon, 02 August 2021 20:34 UTC

Return-Path: <joe@salowey.net>
X-Original-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20B233A1B94 for <secdir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 2 Aug 2021 13:34:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.897
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=salowey-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vECHJCxGVxbO for <secdir@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 2 Aug 2021 13:34:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lf1-x12a.google.com (mail-lf1-x12a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::12a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 580E53A1B85 for <secdir@ietf.org>; Mon, 2 Aug 2021 13:34:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lf1-x12a.google.com with SMTP id c16so6472390lfc.2 for <secdir@ietf.org>; Mon, 02 Aug 2021 13:34:06 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=salowey-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=0WEj92hSRCOTEu4ApPO0j8hacTsj46xCBVVJu+NakPY=; b=Ub/hbtkNi6R7/7h2M/FzcgwOMxu3pu+Ena5jaOLuL52P2tRNe06ypfH5Rjd6TodPWS w8ThCpeypsCcYuUc+GdvRMQ/mFh3oEYqB4eBJWKGo3k9TJL65oSRYAV4wpZz3HSzQmfH 4NjgnK3b/9cz78u9sX8br1VVzvbvsj12hZKNVVIFfiItgJnriUw3hLvRIJ9z7Q82VF0i qw2yMY3Myx6ni5+R9wHzQF1I3mZuCt7sJCqEji/574BRL3BhFL8DhJxjGjNlxkUZ3Voe q/R2V8jISWq2Z+41DExp18JNPyQxArQ9bkokSzzDdzDSM8jFI3hYVHfDmSASJwUoKH21 TDMg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=0WEj92hSRCOTEu4ApPO0j8hacTsj46xCBVVJu+NakPY=; b=qfdBT+omUijP4gKZ0lxGC12o3AWS9w43HvNZ0jj9uPDoA3YqIJainxo+xEly/WvE9W BlZRykJeSdtePgpbxq+XDcz02BdfOROGen21c2bnxGW6VPIkiC9ckq8MnIN8ok3KBl7G yeUPaltw496eSk5fbUrkFdgReNUlZ77YnRlJADs/lpqsmgcfqPrq865+chZGjlGkRIZS 7Y+yqNA1JPrpmT/eXEhRgGFbwpfnkaHN8FTWVkt00vs//XsHQOphsZ9CdfGIxt8zUC8D acYZJrVkMK3pXkXzmNGbrIyIgL8DgBu8FxnOcz4XYcdORAhUcla/shOtyU3eIhpVZ3aF 3PWA==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530LiG7jTnNz7HXmjuvmMn8rMIMlpazajXach410vpv/F5YtZKTR 7BpevKfgTb5KcMDEijqyjwjy41eU1l8q/pvHmDNQeQ==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwWn4JWbcJMO3cusqyRcItuMlr1xNrYm8fhv3G3UVgJivElT2sWvC/r9Wj1MiFCC3LrC1c4qhUeHl8mk92hFN4=
X-Received: by 2002:a19:4944:: with SMTP id l4mr13889303lfj.428.1627936439222; Mon, 02 Aug 2021 13:33:59 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <162723422613.4754.2816752947598222075@ietfa.amsl.com> <86B9EF7F-8AC1-49A5-B33D-F9A8D5A96A45@mnot.net>
In-Reply-To: <86B9EF7F-8AC1-49A5-B33D-F9A8D5A96A45@mnot.net>
From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Date: Mon, 2 Aug 2021 13:33:48 -0700
Message-ID: <CAOgPGoB7a1-YCdvEqr_ZAdJ38GiA5HPU+T-S10jqu=C4argp5A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis.all@ietf.org, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, last-call@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000002d5d1b05c8997dbe"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/vn0EQh78cEP70y4m7FetP63M34w>
Subject: Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis-12
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdir/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 02 Aug 2021 20:34:14 -0000

On Sun, Jul 25, 2021 at 7:43 PM Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:

> Thanks for the review. I've opened an issue to track it:
>   https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1582
>
> Responses below.
>
>
> > On 26 Jul 2021, at 3:30 am, Joseph Salowey via Datatracker <
> noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>
> > Major Issues:
> >
> > + I had trouble with section 4.12 Client Authentication which states:
> >
> > "Applications can use HTTP authentication Section 11 of
> > [I-D.ietf-httpbis-semantics] to identify clients. The Basic
> authentication
> > scheme [RFC7617] MUST NOT be used unless the underlying transport is
> > authenticated, integrity-protected and confidential (e.g., as provided
> the
> > "HTTPS" URI scheme, or another using TLS). The Digest scheme [RFC7616]
> MUST NOT
> > be used unless the underlying transport is similarly secure, or the
> chosen hash
> > algorithm is not "MD5"."
> >
> > I'm not sure what the "or chosen hash algorithm is not "MD5" is meant to
> say.
> > What I think the document should say is:
> >
> > The Digest scheme [RFC7616] MUST NOT be used unless the underlying
> transport is
> > similarly secure. The "MD5" digest algorithm MUST NOT be used.
>
> Hmm. I forgot that RFC7616 has a pre-existing requirement in Section 5.1:
>
> > If Digest Authentication is being used, it SHOULD be over a secure
> channel like HTTPS [RFC2818].
>
> Are we saying that that SHOULD is really a MUST for all uses of HTTP, or
> just those in scope for this document? Likewise for the effective
> deprecation of md5.
>
> If so, perhaps the easiest thing to do would be to state that clearly;
> e.g.,
>
> """
> [RFC7616] Section 5.1 recommends that the Digest scheme be used over a
> secure channel like HTTPS. This document strengthens that recommendation to
> MUST, and deprecates the md5 hash algorithm in the Digest scheme.
> """
>
> ... and listing 7616 as being updated by this document.
>
> Thoughts?
>

[Joe]  I think we should deprecate MD5 in all cases and I also think you
should treat digest as basic auth and run it over a secure channel in all
cases.  The text update looks good.


>
> > + There is a security consideration that I think the document should
> cover.
> > Many HTTP based protocols make heavy use of bearer tokens, such as
> session
> > cookies, for authentication and authorization purposes.  This means that
> an
> > attacker that can eavesdrop on HTTP communications can often escalate
> their
> > privilege to perform operations on resources.   I think you could add
> this to
> > the security considerations:
> >
> > " Section 4.4.2 requires support for 'https' URLs, and discourages the
> use of
> > 'http' URLs, to provide authentication, integrity and confidentiality,
> as well
> > as mitigate pervasive monitoring attacks.  Many HTTP based protocols
> make heavy
> > use of bearer tokens, such as session cookies, for authentication and
> > authorization purposes.  This means that an attacker that can eavesdrop
> on HTTP
> > communications can often escalate their privilege to perform operations
> on
> > resources. "
>
> See
> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/commit/fe3f298e4d60514306e391398cc870abaedd8bf9
>
> [Joe] Looks good.


> > Minor Issues:
> >
> > + Section 4.5.1 - This could be a good place to mention RFC-8470 on TLS
> 1.3
> > early data which can also be a source of GET request replay
>
> See
> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/commit/b03c376179e278deb3d994eac152c6a131702840
>
>
[Joe] I left a comment with a text suggestion.


> Cheers,
>
> --
> Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/
>
>