Re: [secdir] [Anima] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-16

Michael Richardson <> Tue, 02 October 2018 00:32 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <>
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Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2018 20:32:28 -0400
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [Anima] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-16
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Brian E Carpenter <> wrote:
    > It's not quite that.

    > We sell X's. We cannot control how the X's are used. But if they are
    > used without calling home to our MASA, we cannot certify that they are
    > genuine X's. They might be counterfeit X's.

Or, they might be genuine X's running trojaned's software.

The fact that between leaving seller A and buyer C, they were activated by
attacker M will be in the MASA's audit log, if buyer C looks.

{Can attacker M replace software via serial console without leaving a trace?
Not BRSKI's problem exactly, but it's certainly a concern}

    > BRSKI is a way of proving that the X announcing its identity as X12345
    > really is the one and only X12345.

    > If you sell it to someone who doesn't care about that, they can use it
    > anyway.

Depending upon the software in X, you may be able to hook up a craft/serial
console and just configure it the way you want, just like you do today.

Or it might be some new-fangled SDN switch that won't operate with a
controller attached, and it doesn't even have a serial console.  Nothing I
can do will change that.

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