Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-pce-pcep-extension-for-pce-controller-10

Thanks for this review, Yaron!

In particular...

On Sat, Feb 06, 2021 at 11:34:44AM -0800, Yaron Sheffer via Datatracker wrote:
> Reviewer: Yaron Sheffer
> Review result: Not Ready
> 
[...]
> 
> - RFC 8283 which defines the architecture that is implemented by this draft
> says:
> 
> [The] security implications of SDN have not been fully discussed or described. 
> Therefore, protocol and applicability work-around solutions for this
> architecture must take proper account of these concerns.
> 
> It is expected that each new document that is produced for a specific use case
> will also include considerations of the security impacts of the use of a
> PCE-based central controller on the network type and services being managed.
> 
> I don't think that the current document addresses this challenge.

... this point is something that I am *very* happy is being raised as soon
as possible.

Like you, I am not very satisfied with the initial email response (though I
did not open up the attached diff), so I hope that we will see more on this
front before the document advances to the IESG.

Thanks again,

Ben

> In general, this looks like a very monolithic architecture, where everybody
> trusts everybody else once they've been authenticated. Although Sec. 9.1
> discusses the case of a malicious PCE (which would be rather catastrophic), I
> would encourage the authors to consider whether a malicious PCC can also
> disrupt the PCE's operations and cause "major impact to the network".
> 
> 
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