[secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-07

Chris Lonvick <lonvick.ietf@gmail.com> Wed, 09 December 2015 01:11 UTC

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To: "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession.all@tools.ietf
From: Chris Lonvick <lonvick.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2015 19:11:48 -0600
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Subject: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-07
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Hi,

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. 
These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security 
area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these 
comments just like any other last call comments.

Overall, the document looks pretty good.

I'd  recommend taking another look at the Security Considerations 
section. It is sufficient and contains everything that I think needs to 
be said. However, it may be a bit more clear if you separate the 
security concerns of the protocol, from the security concerns of 
credential management and policy. As I see it, the first and last 
paragraphs are concerned with credentials and policy while the middle 
paragraphs have statements about the actual protocol.

As a nit, I would suggest defining PoP at some point. While it's pretty 
obvious, I just like the traditional use of defining it before it's 
used.  :-)

Best regards,
Chris