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Re: [secdir] [taugh.com-standards] Security review of draft-levine-herkula-oneclick-05

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Sun, 18 September 2016 17:09 UTC

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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 18:09:05 +0100
Message-ID: <CABrd9SQNM2e3AJwLSgzXV54MzKRf0MZ9_E+GPaT2oCzFwajdpQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: "John R. Levine" <johnl@iecc.com>
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Cc: draft-levine-herkula-oneclick.all@ietf.org, Paul Kincaid-Smith <paulkincaidsmith@gmail.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] [taugh.com-standards] Security review of draft-levine-herkula-oneclick-05
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On 18 September 2016 at 18:07, John R. Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:
>>> I don't think that's right.  The usual way to verify a 2369 unsubscribe
>>> is
>>> to ask for confirmation, either in a web page if the URI is an http or
>>> https, or by writing back if it's mailto:.  That doesn't change for the
>>> current GET syntax of 2369.
>>
>>
>> If the goal is to prevent spoofed mails leading to unsubscription,
>> then it applies in either case.
>
>
> It's only a goal here because they have other ways to do it if it's not
> one-click.

Ok, then in that case it seems like you only need to secure the POST
arguments, not the URI.

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