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Re: [Secdispatch] Request for secdispatch time slot in Vancouver IETF: Client-Cert HTTP Header

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Mon, 30 March 2020 18:17 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
CC: IETF SecDispatch <secdispatch@ietf.org>, "secdispatch-chairs@ietf.org" <secdispatch-chairs@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Secdispatch] Request for secdispatch time slot in Vancouver IETF: Client-Cert HTTP Header
Thread-Index: AQHWBFxLVTcxakOIMk25J8Uizezb5ahhvuSAgAAJuYD//74HgA==
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 18:16:11 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] Request for secdispatch time slot in Vancouver IETF: Client-Cert HTTP Header
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I support this document. A standardized place for a TLS-terminating intermediary to present the certificate to an origin is a good thing.  It will make CDN customers more portable.

Maybe this is a point solution that most of the Internet doesn’t care about.  But measurable portion should care and would benefit.

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