Re: [Secdispatch] EDHOC Summary

Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> Sat, 13 April 2019 22:38 UTC

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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: 'Martin Thomson' <mt@lowentropy.net>, 'Göran Selander' <goran.selander@ericsson.com>, secdispatch@ietf.org
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Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2019 15:38:37 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] EDHOC Summary
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Secdispatch <secdispatch-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Martin
> Thomson
> Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2019 7:57 PM
> To: Göran Selander <goran.selander@ericsson.com>; secdispatch@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] EDHOC Summary
> 
> On Tue, Apr 9, 2019, at 21:57, Göran Selander wrote:
> > [GS] There seems to be consensus on the summary provided by the
> > Security ADs, which includes the problem statement.
> 
> The entire point of my mail was to contest that point.
> 
> > [GS] There is no competing solution to the problem statement. As been
> > witnessed, people have waited for years for this to progress.
> > Therefore I don't see anything premature with assuming EDHOC to be a
> > starting point for the WG.
> 
> So you would prefer to disregard the work done by Eric and Jim completely?

Don't forget that one of the issues that was identified by me was that by the time I was finished I felt that an entirely new security analysis was going to be required to make sure that nothing was broken.

Jim

> 
> > [GS] Concrete targets with numbers have been presented, for example
> here:
> > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/vNR7nT20fsvYjYXhAPjO
> > pLjZGCU
> 
> Presented, yes.  Agreed, no.
> 
> > [GS] A lightweight AKE on application layer, which this specific WG is
> > proposed to work on, is actually a missing enabler for constrained
> > nodes to  "communicate among themselves and with the wider Internet".
> > Indeed, if the security protocol is too heavy or needs to terminate in
> > a gateway due to change of transport etc., then end-to-end secure
> > communication between the endpoints will not take place, thus
> > preventing "to partake in permissionless innovation".
> 
> I think that you missed my point.  If the goal is to provide an AKE, then any
> AKE will do.  If the goal is to communicate with other Internet nodes, then
> you might argue that any AKE will do, but you at least have to consider what
> existing Internet nodes do in making that call.
> 
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