Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 17 September 2019 18:19 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com>, "secdispatch\@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 14:19:25 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI
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Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com> wrote:
    > I've posted a new version with minor tweaks to make that more clear.

    > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pq-pkix-problem-statement/

Thank you. I understand much better the three possibilities now.

As I understand it:
1) new algorithm numbers, "RSA+PQ1", "ECDSA+PQ2", etc.  works with old code
   because old-algorithms are negotiated.  Requires negotiation.

2) multiple certificate chains: seems to work well with web servers, but
   in my experience fails with everything else.  The "weak" chain fails
   and then what?

3) new certificates; the v3-extension hack is just that, a hack to do
   multiple certificate chains in a single object.   I assume that the PQx
   signature would cover the legacy public key value as well?

I prefer (3), btw.  (1) hadn't occured to me, as I don't think it works
well with objects at rest, such as firmware updates.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works
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