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Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Can Composite sigs move back to LAMPS?

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Sat, 18 January 2020 21:13 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 16:13:50 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Can Composite sigs move back to LAMPS?
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Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
    mcr> In particular, it seems to me that we could add these multiple
    mcr> entries to
    mcr> certificates, using dummy algorithms, and test them in the field
    mcr> against
    mcr> existing browsers, web servers, IDS, firewalls, etc.

    > It's not quite clear to me how this would work. As I understand it,
    > this involves replacing the existing public keys and signatures, in
    > which case they won't be acceptable to any Web browser (and you in
    > fact won't be able to get BR-compliant certs)....

No, it involves two sets of signatures.
The traditional set and the new, yet-to-be-precisely-defined set.

It could be that CAFORUM rules would presently prevent these certificates
From going into production, and during an experiment, that would be okay, I
think.

The reason to start this work now is to wring out the obsticales such as
BR/CABFORUM rules that would prevent/slow-down adoption.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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