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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:02:23 +0300
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To: Dennis Jackson <ietf=40dennis-jackson.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>
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 <1dfeec9e-ce3c-4338-bac2-48644016016c@dennis-jackson.uk>
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The difference is that no IETF working group wanted to create a document =
that uses any of those. We do have at least one working group that has a =
document with FrodoKEM.

Yoav

> On 22 Jul 2026, at 19:46, Dennis Jackson =
<ietf=3D40dennis-jackson.uk@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> I believe ISE would be the appropriate outcome. The CFRG's time is =
best spent on cryptography for which there is widespread demand.=20
>=20
> The ISE has published other non-mainstream cryptographic specs such =
as:
>=20
>   - RFC 5794 =E2=80=94 ARIA=20
>   - RFC 6986 =E2=80=94 GOST/Streebog
>   - RFC 8998 =E2=80=94 ShangMi SM2/SM3/SM4
>=20
> Best,
> Dennis
>=20
> On 22/07/2026 17:46, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> Hi.
>>=20
>> Here=E2=80=99s an issue that came up at the IPsecME meeting this =
week. We have a working group document for post-quantum key exchange in =
IKEv2 with FrodoKEM [1].  This document has a normative reference to an =
ISO 18033-2 document ([2]) that defines FrodoKEM.  At least, I think it =
defines FrodoKEM - I didn=E2=80=99t pay the 204 CHF to get a copy.  At =
the meeting, it was pointed out that it would be a problem getting our =
draft published when it has a normative reference to a cryptographic =
standard behind a paywall. As it turns out, IPsecME is not alone - LAMPS =
has two candidate drafts that also use FrodoKEM ([3], [4]), although =
those two have not been adopted.
>>=20
>> There is a draft ([5]) that specifies the same FrodoKEM algorithm. =
However, CFRG is not interested in re-documenting somebody else=E2=80=99s =
cryptography. At least not anymore. In the past CFRG has written RFCs =
that covered algorithms invented by others:
>> OCB (RFC 7253) was previously described in academic papers, all =
listed as informative references in the RFC
>> ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC 7539 and 8439) - the ChaCha20 and Poly1305 =
algorithms were previously described in academic papers, but the =
combination was new,
>> Curve25519 and Curve448 (RFC 7748) - both curves had been described =
before.
>> AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) - also described in academic papers before.
>>=20
>> In the case of academic papers, it often made sense to re-describe =
the algorithm in an RFC because the academic papers were more concerned =
with security proofs than with the things engineers need to implement: =
excruciating details, test vectors, edge cases. While this may not apply =
to FrodoKEM, the message at CFRG today was that the research group is =
not interested in producing these specifications for engineers anymore.=20=

>>=20
>> So the question is, where do documents like draft-longa-cfrg-frodokem =
go in the IETF.  In my opinion, of the three =E2=80=9Cdispatch=E2=80=9D =
outcomes, both ISE and AD-sponsored are bad options. A document like =
that needs review. While the IETF does not have change control in the =
sense that we can=E2=80=99t change FrodoKEM, the description, the test =
vectors, all the explanations can be changed. There is also the need to =
review that the described algorithm is the same. Daniel Van Geest =
volunteered to review the FrodoKEM document for consistency with the ISO =
document, but we would have to find someone to make this review for each =
document. Maybe an LLM could help there.
>>=20
>> So I am suggesting that we need a working group for specifying =
cryptographic algorithms for IETF consumption. A little late for this =
meeting=E2=80=99s Dispatch/SecDispatch meeting, but might as well get =
the process started.
>>=20
>> What do others think?
>>=20
>> Yoav
>> (as both IPsecME co-chair and co-author of RFC 8439)
>>=20
>> [1] =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo=
/
>> [2] https://www.iso.org/standard/86890.html
>> [3] =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-smyslov-lamps-frodokem-certificates=
/
>> [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-lamps-cms-frodokem/
>> [5] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-longa-cfrg-frodokem/
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Secdispatch mailing list -- secdispatch@ietf.org =
<mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
>> To unsubscribe send an email to secdispatch-leave@ietf.org =
<mailto:secdispatch-leave@ietf.org>
> _______________________________________________
> Secdispatch mailing list -- secdispatch@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to secdispatch-leave@ietf.org


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<html aria-label=3D"message body"><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" =
content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body =
style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
line-break: after-white-space;">The difference is that no IETF working =
group wanted to create a document that uses any of those. We do have at =
least one working group that has a document with =
FrodoKEM.<div><br></div><div>Yoav<br =
id=3D"lineBreakAtBeginningOfMessage"><div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div>On 22 Jul 2026, at 19:46, Dennis Jackson =
&lt;ietf=3D40dennis-jackson.uk@dmarc.ietf.org&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div>

 =20
    <meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3DUTF-8">
 =20
  <div><p>I believe ISE would be the appropriate outcome. The CFRG's =
time
      is best spent on cryptography for which there is widespread
      demand.&nbsp;</p><p>The ISE has published other non-mainstream =
cryptographic specs
      such as:<br>
      <br>
      &nbsp; - RFC 5794 =E2=80=94 ARIA&nbsp;<br>
      &nbsp; - RFC 6986 =E2=80=94 GOST/Streebog<br>
      &nbsp; - RFC 8998 =E2=80=94 ShangMi SM2/SM3/SM4</p><p>Best,<br>
      Dennis</p>
    <div class=3D"moz-cite-prefix">On 22/07/2026 17:46, Yoav Nir =
wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite" =
cite=3D"mid:CC8B4A12-4C4D-4D31-B40E-998BA35FC213@gmail.com">Hi.
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Here=E2=80=99s an issue that came up at the IPsecME meeting =
this
        week. We have a working group document for post-quantum key
        exchange in IKEv2 with FrodoKEM [1]. &nbsp;This document has a
        normative reference to an ISO 18033-2 document ([2]) that
        defines FrodoKEM. &nbsp;At least, I think it defines FrodoKEM - =
I
        didn=E2=80=99t pay the 204 CHF to get a copy. &nbsp;At the =
meeting, it was
        pointed out that it would be a problem getting our draft
        published when it has a normative reference to a cryptographic
        standard behind a paywall. As it turns out, IPsecME is not alone
        - LAMPS has two candidate drafts that also use FrodoKEM ([3],
        [4]), although those two have not been adopted.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>There is a draft ([5]) that specifies the same FrodoKEM
        algorithm. However, CFRG is not interested in re-documenting
        somebody else=E2=80=99s cryptography. At least not anymore. In =
the past
        CFRG has written RFCs that covered algorithms invented by
        others:</div>
      <div>
        <ul class=3D"MailOutline">
          <li>OCB (RFC 7253) was previously described in academic
            papers, all listed as informative references in the RFC</li>
          <li>ChaCha20-Poly1305 (RFC 7539 and 8439) - the ChaCha20 and
            Poly1305 algorithms were previously described in academic
            papers, but the combination was new,</li>
          <li>Curve25519 and Curve448 (RFC 7748) - both curves had been
            described before.</li>
          <li>AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) - also described in academic papers
            before.</li>
        </ul>
      </div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>In the case of academic papers, it often made sense to
        re-describe the algorithm in an RFC because the academic papers
        were more concerned with security proofs than with the things
        engineers need to implement: excruciating details, test vectors,
        edge cases. While this may not apply to FrodoKEM, the message at
        CFRG today was that the research group is not interested in
        producing these specifications for engineers =
anymore.&nbsp;</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>So the question is, where do documents like
        draft-longa-cfrg-frodokem go in the IETF. &nbsp;In my opinion, =
of the
        three =E2=80=9Cdispatch=E2=80=9D outcomes, both ISE and =
AD-sponsored are bad
        options. A document like that needs review. While the IETF does
        not have change control in the sense that we can=E2=80=99t =
change
        FrodoKEM, the description, the test vectors, all the
        explanations can be changed. There is also the need to review
        that the described algorithm is the same. Daniel Van Geest
        volunteered to review the FrodoKEM document for consistency with
        the ISO document, but we would have to find someone to make this
        review for each document. Maybe an LLM could help there.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>So I am suggesting that we need a working group for
        specifying cryptographic algorithms for IETF consumption. A
        little late for this meeting=E2=80=99s Dispatch/SecDispatch =
meeting, but
        might as well get the process started.</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>What do others think?</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>Yoav</div>
      <div>(as both IPsecME co-chair and co-author of RFC 8439)</div>
      <div><br>
      </div>
      <div>[1]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ike=
v2-frodo/" moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-iet=
f-ipsecme-hybrid-kem-ikev2-frodo/</a></div>
      <div>[2]&nbsp;<span><a =
href=3D"https://www.iso.org/standard/86890.html" moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext">https://www.iso.org/standard/86890.html</a=
></span></div>
      <div><span>[3]&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-smyslov-lamps-frodokem-cert=
ificates/" moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-smy=
slov-lamps-frodokem-certificates/</a></div>
      <div>[4]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-lamps-cms-frodokem/" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-che=
n-lamps-cms-frodokem/</a></div>
      <div>[5]&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-longa-cfrg-frodokem/" =
moz-do-not-send=3D"true" =
class=3D"moz-txt-link-freetext">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lon=
ga-cfrg-frodokem/</a></div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class=3D"moz-mime-attachment-header"></fieldset>
      <pre wrap=3D"" =
class=3D"moz-quote-pre">_______________________________________________
Secdispatch mailing list -- <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" =
href=3D"mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org">secdispatch@ietf.org</a>
To unsubscribe send an email to <a class=3D"moz-txt-link-abbreviated" =
href=3D"mailto:secdispatch-leave@ietf.org">secdispatch-leave@ietf.org</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>Secdispatch mailing =
list -- secdispatch@ietf.org<br>To unsubscribe send an email to =
secdispatch-leave@ietf.org<br></div></blockquote></div><br></div></body></=
html>=

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