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Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI

Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com> Tue, 17 September 2019 19:04 UTC

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From: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI
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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 19:04:06 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI
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Hi Michael,

Yup, Those are the general ideas, with one small correction; for 1) what we've proposed in draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo that has the algorithmID "Composite", and then the octet string for its public key data is an encoded SEQUENCE of SubjectPublicKeyInfos for RSA, PQ1, etc, -- basically the SPKI contains a list of SPKIs. Same trick for signatureAlgorithm and signatureValue.

This subtle difference avoids the explosion of pairwise OIDs "RSA+PQ1", "ECDSA+PQ2", etc. Also, this allows a legacy client to continue processing if it doesn't understand the OID for PQ2, but its local policy says that ECDSA alone is still ok for now, so there's a crypto agility win.

- - -
Mike Ounsworth | Office: +1 (613) 270-2873

-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> 
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2019 1:19 PM
To: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com>; secdispatch@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI


Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com> wrote:
    > I've posted a new version with minor tweaks to make that more clear.

    > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pq-pkix-problem-statement/

Thank you. I understand much better the three possibilities now.

As I understand it:
1) new algorithm numbers, "RSA+PQ1", "ECDSA+PQ2", etc.  works with old code
   because old-algorithms are negotiated.  Requires negotiation.

2) multiple certificate chains: seems to work well with web servers, but
   in my experience fails with everything else.  The "weak" chain fails
   and then what?

3) new certificates; the v3-extension hack is just that, a hack to do
   multiple certificate chains in a single object.   I assume that the PQx
   signature would cover the legacy public key value as well?

I prefer (3), btw.  (1) hadn't occured to me, as I don't think it works well with objects at rest, such as firmware updates.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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