Re: [Secdispatch] Request for a slot at the Secdispatch IETF 113 Session

Hi David
Thank you for your interest in the draft.  You’re right to highlight the benefit of privacy but, as you will see when you read the draft, we highlight a range of issues that can reasonably be considered as being in the interest of end users such as security, cost and complexity.

Focusing specifically on privacy, it is of course more complex than encryption.  For example, as noted in the draft, by removing an indicator of compromise (the SNI data), a user may be at greater risk of attack from malicious content or simply by surveillance by badly behaved client software.

RFC 8890 highlights the importance of multistakeholder input in order to understand the potential trade-offs between competing factors that may impact end users.  This is an instance where such engagement would be beneficial as it will no doubt highlight other considerations to take into account.

As you conclude, let’s discuss it at Secdispatch but I believe that debate will be more useful if we avoid using such a narrow interpretation of end users' interests.

Andrew

________________________________
From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 1:01 am
To: Andrew Campling <andrew.campling@419.consulting>
Cc: secdispatch@ietf.org <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] Request for a slot at the Secdispatch IETF 113 Session

Hi Andrew,

(I'm writing as an IAB member, but not representing the IAB)

Your understanding of IAB document RFC 8890 is incorrect. Encrypting the TLS Client Hello is performed to protect end users. In particular, it is an example of Section 4.2 "Creating User-Focused Systems" as it brings control over information sharing closer to the end users. Additionally, ECH was the product of Section 4.3 "Identifying Negative End-User Impact" as we have seen abuse of user information caused by networks observing the SNI. That section additionally references RFCs 7258 and 7624 which clearly lay out the dangers of cleartext information and the user benefit of encryption. If you'd like more information on the IAB's position on this topic, we also released the following statement: <https://www.iab.org/2014/11/14/iab-statement-on-internet-confidentiality/>.

You're welcome to raise your concerns about ECH, but they are in the opposite of the spirit of RFC 8890. Let's discuss your draft at secdispatch, but I can't imagine it progressing with such a clear misunderstanding of RFC 8890.

Thanks,
David

On Wed, Mar 16, 2022 at 9:15 AM Andrew Campling <andrew.campling@419.consulting> wrote:
I would like to request some time to dispatch draft-campling-ech-deployment-considerations<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-campling-ech-deployment-considerations-01.txt> at IETF 113.  The draft is intended to inject additional detail about deployment considerations relating to Encrypted Client Hello by including observations on current use cases for SNI data in a variety of contexts.  In the spirit of RFC 8890, we believe that end-user needs to be taken into account in protocol development and we hope that this document is one small step in that process.

Andrew

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