Re: [Secdispatch] [saag] Interest COVID-19 'passport' standardization?

Dirk-Willem van Gulik <dirkx@webweaving.org> Fri, 30 July 2021 21:39 UTC

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From: Dirk-Willem van Gulik <dirkx@webweaving.org>
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Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2021 23:35:57 +0200
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Cc: Henry Story <henry.story@gmail.com>, IETF SecDispatch <secdispatch@ietf.org>, IETF SAAG <saag@ietf.org>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] [saag] Interest COVID-19 'passport' standardization?
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On 30 Jul 2021, at 23:23, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 30, 2021 at 2:19 PM Henry Story <henry.story@gmail.com <mailto:henry.story@gmail.com>> wrote:
> The knowledge about the virus and the responses to it are evolving
> very quickly, and so the flexibility of W3C Verifiable Credentials 
> comes in very handy here, as it is built on semantic web standards
> built on top of first order logic, hypergraphs, and designed for 
> decentralisation, and evolvability. 
> 
> I don't really agree with this claim. Some of the proposals here use
> VC and some do not, but they all seem roughly equally capable and 
> flexible to me.

From an implementor/designing perspective (both the NL domestic version -and- the EU DCC version)  — and although we tried very very hard - the absolute need for totally off-line use & preventing surveillance*, also, or especially by the issuing entities  (or blind trust in) combined with the inflexible state of the available semi-usable VC implementations and the very strong desire to have nothing ‘central’ and no ‘central trust’ - had us gradually evolve to something not quite VC. Despite this being the stated goal.

So I think we have some useful lessons learned w.r.t. the importance of off-line / totally local validation.

Dw

*:  e.g. spiked certificates with something unlikely to be cached or requiring a very unique lookup/OCSP, etc.