Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 13/09/2019 15:02, Mike Ounsworth wrote:
> Hi Kathleen,
> 
> I'm new to IETF, and looking for guidance. If an agenda spot in
> Singapore is the right next step to get visibility and discussion,
> then I'm happy to do that.

FWIW, while I'm not keen on Mike's particular proposal,
I would also support having a slot to discuss this a
bit. (On the basis that I might well be wrong, as often
happens, or to help tee up a bigger discussion if one's
desirable later:-)

Cheers,
S.

> 
> Thanks! -Mike
> 
> 
> 
> From: Kathleen Moriarty Sent: Friday, September 13, 04:42 Subject:
> [EXTERNAL]Re: [Secdispatch] Problem statement for post-quantum
> multi-algorithm PKI To: Mike Ounsworth Cc: [e-mail]
> 
> 
> WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust Datacard. DO NOT
> CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the
> content is safe.
> 
> Mike,
> 
> Are you looking for an agenda spot in Singapore?
> 
> Additionally, it would be good to see discussion on list in advance,
> so thank you for posting your message.
> 
> Best regards, Kathleen
> 
> Sent from my mobile device
> 
>> On Sep 11, 2019, at 5:11 PM, Mike Ounsworth
>> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi SecDispatch,
>> 
>> This got bounced here from LAMPS because the scope is potentially
>> more than a "limited" pkix change, and because this needs multi-WG
>> visibility to decide on a category of solution.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Background / history --------------------
>> 
>> The Post-Quantum community (for example, surrounding the NIST PQC
>> competition), is pushing for "hybridized" crypto that combines
>> RSA/ECC with new primitives in order to hedge our bets against both
>> quantum adversaries, and also algorithmic / mathematical breaks of
>> the new primitives.
>> 
>> 
>> A year and a half ago, a draft was put to LAMPS for putting PQ
>> public key and signatures into X.509v3 extensions. This draft has
>> been allowed to expire, but is being pursued at the ITU. 
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509/>truskovsky<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509/>-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509/<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509/>
>>
>>
>>
>> 
Earlier this year, a new draft was put to LAMPS for defining "composite"
public key and signature algorithms that, essentially, concatenate
multiple crypto algorithms into a single key or signature octet string.
This draft stalled in LAMPS over whether it is the correct overall approach.
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs/>ounsworth<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs/>-pq-composite-<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs/>sigs<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs/>/<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ounsworth-pq-composite-sigs/>
>>
>>
>>
>> 
Now I'm taking a step back and submitting a draft that acts as a
semi-formal problem statement, and an overview of the three main
categories of solutions.
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pq-pkix-problem-statement/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> My Opinion ----------
>> 
>> Personally, I'm fairly agnostic to the chosen solution, but feel
>> that we need some kind of standard(s) around the post-quantum
>> transition for certificates and PKI. Personally, I feel that
>> Composite is mature enough as an idea to standardize as a tool in
>> our toolbox for contexts where it makes sense, even if a different
>> mechanism is preferred for TLS and IPSEC/IKE.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Requested action from SECDISPATCH 
>> ---------------------------------
>> 
>> 1. Feedback on the problem statement draft.
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pq-pkix-problem-statement/
>> 
>> 2. Discussion of how to progress this.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> PS I'm a new IETF'er, please be gentle :P
>> 
>> Thanks, - - - Mike Ounsworth | Software Security Architect Entrust
>> Datacard
>> 
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> 
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