Re: [Secdispatch] [Iot-onboarding] DANE IOT proposed outcome

Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> Wed, 18 November 2020 15:48 UTC

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From: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2020 10:48:10 -0500
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To: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi@ericsson.com>
Cc: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "iot-onboarding@ietf.org" <iot-onboarding@ietf.org>, IETF SecDispatch <secdispatch@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] [Iot-onboarding] DANE IOT proposed outcome
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I assume we can cover this at tomorrow's side meeting. I'm not fully
informed of the details of the network access authentication use case
specifically (I'm sure Ash will elaborate), but I assume there are other
possibilities for authenticating the server side in those environments,
such as straight PKIX auth with a pre-provisioned small trust anchor set.

Shumon.

On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 10:10 AM Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi@ericsson.com>
wrote:

> Hi Shumon,
>
> Why won't the same issue apply to the IoT bootstrapping and the SIM card
> use case you described.  You would likely authenticate the server before
> revealing the client identity. And that cannot happen with DANE because of
> lack of initial Internet connectivity. If this is the case, then I fail to
> understand some of the excitement for use in IoT bootstrapping. Also, I am
> not sure if verifying DNSSEC signatures sent inside the proposed TLS
> extension would be simple and lightweight for IoT devices?
>
> --Mohit
> On 11/18/20 4:09 PM, Shumon Huque wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 7:58 AM Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=
> 40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Ash and Shumon,
>>
>> My understanding is that your solution is applicable to any scenario that
>> uses client certificates. Obviously IoT might be one application area for
>> this, but there are many other uses of client authentication with
>> certificates.
>>
> Mohit - yes, there are certainly other application use cases and the
> protocol is general purpose. Some SMTP transport security folks are
> interested in this to give one example.
>
> I don't have any strong opinions about whether this is useful or not. But
>> it might be good to have a separate focused DANE working group for these
>> drafts if there is strong demand for such a solution. Your presentation
>> also highlighted your intention of defining new RRtype and/or expanding the
>> scope of TLSA. These things (along with DANE light etc.) would require the
>> input of DNS and TLS folks (in addition to the IoT requirements).
>>
>
> Yup, we will certainly need to get their input on this topic. I think I
> saw a couple folks in the chat suggest resurrecting the DANE wg, which I'm
> open to, but there was pushback too (I think more detailed discussion on
> list was deemed necessary first).
>
> Also, I didn't understand how would server authentication work? I probably
>> did not listen to your presentation carefully enough but I suppose you
>> cannot use DANE for server authentication in scenarios where the client
>> device does not yet have Internet connectivity. So how would server
>> authentication work in EAP-TLS/SIM card/IoT bootstrapping scenarios you
>> discussed?
>>
>
> Yeah, the EAP-TLS case is trickier for DANE server authentication. There
> are possible mechanisms though - the TLS DNSSEC chain extension (which
> failed to gain consensus in the TLS WG a while back, but which will
> probably be published through the IETF's independent stream) would provide
> a way for the TLS server to deliver its DNS authentication chain inside the
> TLS handshake, obviating the need for the client to perform DNS queries
> prior to Internet connectivity. There are probably other solutions that
> could be devised.
>
> Shumon.
>
>
>