Re: [Secdispatch] Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 14/09/2019 03:19, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
>     > One might think we have plenty of time, given that Real Quantum
>     > Computers are, more than likely, more than 10 years away, and even once
>     > you have one, you cannot use your Quantum Computer to break the
>     > authentication of recorded conversations.
> 
> No, we really don't have plenty of time.
> Some suggest that it is actually already rather *late*
> 
> Long-lived devices (such as automobiles) are being designed today, for
> production in mid-2020s, and many will be on the road until 2040.

Count me unconvinced.

Either those devices will have s/w update or they're screwed
already even without requiring the putative existence of a
quantum computer. And we are discussing authentication
here, mostly of origins I guess, and not confidentiality,
so post-facto attacks don't count afaics.

I'd appreciate if someone could explain the specifics of
the pressing issue here that requires us to not wait for
e.g., the outcome of the NIST competition.

Cheers,
S.


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