Re: [Secdispatch] Draft: Adding SASL to HTTP

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 27 March 2020 19:16 UTC

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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 12:16:31 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
Cc: SECDISPATCH WG <secdispatch@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] Draft: Adding SASL to HTTP
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Hi Rick,

Thanks for bringing this to SECDISPATCH.

Doing a quick read of the draft before the session, the prospect of caching
authentication results via a "s2s" field in a Positive Response stuck out
at me -- is this effectively a bearer token or is there a way envisioned to
bind such cached data to some cryptographic keying material?

Thanks,

Ben

On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 08:24:20AM +0100, Rick van Rein wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> This draft proposes to introduce SASL as an authentication mechanism
> into HTTP.  Adding such mechanisms requires IETF Review according to RFC
> 7235.
> 
> I don't know where to turn, and this has long stopped this proposal from
> progressing.  It currently hangs somewhere between DISPATCH And
> SECDISPATCH, so it would be useful to hear thoughts about this proposal.
> 
> I have been made aware that SASL in HTTP has been tried before; the
> reasons why that didn't finish 15 years ago are resolved in this draft:
> 
> Scalability:
> 
>  - stateless server side (server state relays through the client)
>  - sequential messages distributed over connections is no problem
> 
> Security:
> 
>  - no fixation on DIGEST-MD5 (compatibility pulls down security)
>  - support for channel binding without fixating protocol layering
> 
> 
> Benjamin Kaduk noted my search for IETF mechanisms and responded with:
> 
> > That said, I'm happy to see work in this space and would be willing to
> > AD-sponsor it upon a recommendation of either DISPATCH group, if that is
> > the recommendation.
> 
> The authors of the prior HTTP SASL proposal also welcome this work being
> done.
> 
> 
> What are your recommendations towards this work?
> 
> 
> Thanks,
>  -Rick
> 
> 
> Name:		draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl
> Revision:	04
> Title:		HTTP Authentication with SASL
> Document date:	2020-03-04
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		14
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl-04.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl/
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl-04
> Htmlized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl
> Diff:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl-04
> 
> Abstract:
>    Most application-level protocols standardise their authentication
>    exchanges under the SASL framework.  HTTP has taken another course,
>    and often ends up replicating the work to allow individual
>    mechanisms.  This specification adopts full SASL authentication into
>    HTTP.
> 
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