Re: [Secdispatch] Draft: Adding SASL to HTTP
Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Fri, 27 March 2020 19:16 UTC
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Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 12:16:31 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
Cc: SECDISPATCH WG <secdispatch@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] Draft: Adding SASL to HTTP
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Hi Rick, Thanks for bringing this to SECDISPATCH. Doing a quick read of the draft before the session, the prospect of caching authentication results via a "s2s" field in a Positive Response stuck out at me -- is this effectively a bearer token or is there a way envisioned to bind such cached data to some cryptographic keying material? Thanks, Ben On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 08:24:20AM +0100, Rick van Rein wrote: > Hello, > > This draft proposes to introduce SASL as an authentication mechanism > into HTTP. Adding such mechanisms requires IETF Review according to RFC > 7235. > > I don't know where to turn, and this has long stopped this proposal from > progressing. It currently hangs somewhere between DISPATCH And > SECDISPATCH, so it would be useful to hear thoughts about this proposal. > > I have been made aware that SASL in HTTP has been tried before; the > reasons why that didn't finish 15 years ago are resolved in this draft: > > Scalability: > > - stateless server side (server state relays through the client) > - sequential messages distributed over connections is no problem > > Security: > > - no fixation on DIGEST-MD5 (compatibility pulls down security) > - support for channel binding without fixating protocol layering > > > Benjamin Kaduk noted my search for IETF mechanisms and responded with: > > > That said, I'm happy to see work in this space and would be willing to > > AD-sponsor it upon a recommendation of either DISPATCH group, if that is > > the recommendation. > > The authors of the prior HTTP SASL proposal also welcome this work being > done. > > > What are your recommendations towards this work? > > > Thanks, > -Rick > > > Name: draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl > Revision: 04 > Title: HTTP Authentication with SASL > Document date: 2020-03-04 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 14 > URL: > https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl-04.txt > Status: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl/ > Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl-04 > Htmlized: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl > Diff: > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-vanrein-httpauth-sasl-04 > > Abstract: > Most application-level protocols standardise their authentication > exchanges under the SASL framework. HTTP has taken another course, > and often ends up replicating the work to allow individual > mechanisms. This specification adopts full SASL authentication into > HTTP. > > _______________________________________________ > Secdispatch mailing list > Secdispatch@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch
- [Secdispatch] Draft: Adding SASL to HTTP Rick van Rein
- Re: [Secdispatch] Draft: Adding SASL to HTTP Benjamin Kaduk