Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Wed, 18 September 2019 12:09 UTC

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In-Reply-To: <698c840c-221a-a110-55e9-4c4bd94e7bd8@cs.tcd.ie>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 08:08:55 -0400
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Cc: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Secdispatch] [EXTERNAL]Re: Problem statement for post-quantum multi-algorithm PKI
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+1

It looks fairly certain that PQ algorithms will either be a drop in
replacement requiring no changes or require so much change that PKIX is
pretty much irrelevant. We are not going to be using a Kohnfelder
architecture to support a PKI based on stateful signatures.

The two technologies we are going to need to revisit are Needham-Schroeder
(e.g. Kerberos) and Haber-Stornetta (e.g. Blockchain)

We do have some experience with BlockChain type technologies. Certificate
Transparency for one. But I don't feel like trying to build on top of that
so I wrote a separate BlockChain type technology for the Mathematical Mesh
which is basically Merkle Tree in JSON using JOSE as the crypto base. It
also builds in some of the same ideas from SAML.

The latest draft is here:

http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-mesh-dare.html

This is not designed as a PQ infrastructure but it does have some (much?)
of the infrastructure that you would want for building blocks for PQ.



On Tue, Sep 17, 2019 at 5:17 PM Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Hiya,
>
> On 17/09/2019 21:30, Mike Ounsworth wrote:
> >
> > It sounds like what you're proposing will end up lining up with the
> > still-yet-to-be-defined solution of "just use multiple cert chains",
>
> Nope, sorry for being unclear. I'm coming around to arguing to
> not bother with using x.509 at all any weird new PQ stuff, (like
> stateful sigs or where values are big enough to cause protocol
> problems in places x.509 is currently used), and to definitely
> not embed multiple key/alg stuff inside x.509. Existing x.509
> libraries could then continue to be used really unmodified (so
> no change to what's often pretty flakey cert validation logic,
> only crypto APIs) with current algs or where some PQ alg reall
> fits the current model well enough. In addition, I'd argue to
> wait 'till NIST are done to start in any detailed way. Hope
> that's clearer.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
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