Re: [Secdispatch] Request for secdispatch time slot in Vancouver IETF: Client-Cert HTTP Header

[Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>]

On Fri, Mar 27, 2020 at 10:21:17AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
    >> Overall, I agree that something like this is needed. However,
    >> I have two concerns about the mechanism described here.
    >>
    >> First, as you note in S B.1., if the header is not properly
    >> sanitized, there is a trivial attack and there are stronger
    >> mechanism that do not require sanitization:
    >>
    >> "Client-Cert" header that would appear to the backend to have come
    >> from the reverse proxy.  Although numerous other methods of
    >> detecting/preventing header injection are possible; such as the use
    >> of a unique secret value as part of the header name or value or the
    >> application of a signature, HMAC, or AEAD, there is no common general
    >> standardized mechanism.  The potential problem of client header
    >> injection is not at all unique to the functionality of this draft and
    >> it would therefor be inappropriate for this draft to define a one-off
    >> solution.  In the absence of a generic standardized solution existing
    >> currently, stripping/sanitizing the headers is the de facto means of
    >> protecting against header injection in practice today.  Sanitizing
    >>
    >> This seems like an odd argument to make: if a strong mechanism is
    >> in order, we should design one and make it generic, not just throw
    >> and continue to use weaker mechanisms.

I agree: it seems like we ought to make some kind of more generic mechanism.
It feels like we are creating a new reverse-proxy/framework channel.
The stupidest version I can imagine is two sets of HTTP headers... message/rfc822 like.

There are a bunch of such interfaces around already, and maybe we can do this
if we assume HTTP/2 here.

Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]> wrote:
    > Hmm, that requires the proxy to keep that state around (either locally or
    > in the resumption ticket).  Brainstorming, in TLS 1.3 one could also have
    > the application manage the authentication state by having the proxy not
    > issue tickets right at the handshake completion, and instead wait for the
    > application to return a blob to include in the ticket.  This would provide
    > a convenient excuse for adding a way to secure the proxy/backend channel,
    > with the proxy adding a header with a key fingerprint, and the backend
    > encrypting its response to that key, only if the key is whitelisted in the
    > application's configuration.  On the other hand, it's more moving

I think that you two have potentially given a reasonable technical reason why
this work is not as trivial as envisioned, and that we need to boil a bit
more water here, without an entire ocean.  That maybe it requires a
significant part of a WG, if not an entire WG.

It was mentioned that HTTPBIS plans to cleave of some pieces, but I don't
have the time to follow all of HTTPBIS...

--
Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-