Re: [SECMECH] Framework Bindings Vs. Mechanism Bridges

Charles Clancy <clancy@cs.umd.edu> Sun, 28 August 2005 18:15 UTC

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Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2005 14:15:21 -0400
From: Charles Clancy <clancy@cs.umd.edu>
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To: 1und1 <t.otto@sharevolution.de>
Subject: Re: [SECMECH] Framework Bindings Vs. Mechanism Bridges
References: <Pine.GSO.4.60.0508220801430.1114@ismene><1DCACCAC04655B3AFE9733A8@cumulus><Pine.GSO.4.60.0508221047001.1307@ismene><20050822154044.GE7789@binky.Central.Sun.COM><430CA545.3020109@uni-tuebingen.de><Pine.LNX.4.61.0508241113420.16086@internaut.com><20050824213010.GO10174@binky.Central.Sun.COM><Pine.LNX.4.61.0508241436250.21720@internaut.com><20050825042105.GW10174@binky.Central.Sun.COM><Pine.LNX.4.61.0508242244440.1628@internaut.com> <d4083f6605082712282a55f198@mail.gmail.com> <001301c5abb9$372ea370$029490d4@amilo>
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1und1 wrote:

>>I know of one IEEE 802.11i vendor that developed and sold a Kerberos
>>solution for security/authentication.
> 
> Which company is this? Symbol?
> 
> Symbol.com sells a Kerberos-based solution, but it seems to be proprietary
> and not compliant with IEEE 802.11i.
> 
> I asked in Juli sth for EAP-Kerberos, Tim Alsop answered
> ( http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg08763.html )

Hmm... I doubt they're protecting their Kerberos with TLS... proprietary 
password-based wireless authentication mechanisms likely vulnerable to 
dictionary attacks... LEAP deja vu?

[ t. charles clancy ]--[ tcc@umd.edu ]--[ www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy ]
[ computer science ]-----[ university of maryland | college park ]

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