AW: Re: [SECMECH] Framework Bindings Vs. Mechanism Bridges

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>
>>
>>On Sat, Aug 20, 2005 at 12:58:41AM -0500, Nicolas Williams wrote:
>>> On Fri, Aug 19, 2005 at 11:10:35PM -0400, Shumon Huque wrote:
>>> > I think the Kerberos community needs to work on standardizing password 
>>> > based pre-authentication mechanisms invulnerable to dictionary attack 
>>> > (perhaps EKE, AEKE, SPEKE, SRP etc). Hardware pre-authentication
>>> > mitigates the threat somewhat. But PKINIT isn't really an option for 
>>> > the many sites that don't plan to authenticate users with public key 
>>> > credentials (or deploy PKI).
>>> 
>>> Did you attend the SACRED WG meeting at IETF 63?
>>
>>No, but I just read a summary of their session. The credential
>>mobility stuff isn't really relevant to (non PKINIT) Kerberos
>>sites. So I assume you are referring to the IPR issues with those
>>protocols. It sounds like there might be some hope though!
>>
>>> > At one time, some of us were talking about an EAP method that
>>> > transported Kerberos messages directly. It seems to me that putting
>>> > some effort into completing that work would be immediately useful
>>> > to Kerberos sites that need to deploy 802.1X or 802.11i soon.
>>> 
>>> Indeed.  That would be an example of framework bindings of a security
>>> mechanisms, as opposed to EAP-GSS, which would be a bridge.
>>
>>Agreed.
>>
>>Some folks at Penn are interested in working on an EAP-Kerberos 
>>method. Is there anyone else interested in this?
>
>
>Hi Shumon, 
>
>I`ve also thought about a new EAP method which makes use of Kerberos.
>When designing a new EAP method, it must extend current available set
>of EAP methods by a new mechanism.
>
>Some weeks ago, I`ve asked publicly in the Kerberos Mailing List what
>the folks expect from a EAP-Kerberos method. See <a 
>href="http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/kerberos/2005-July/008131.html">http://m
>ailman.mit.edu/pipermail/kerberos/2005-July/008131.html</a>
>Some opinions can be found there.
>
>There already exists a Kerberos extension to TLS, RFC 2712 (Oct.99),
>which can be run in EAP-TLS, so the question is: 
>
>* Is there need for EAP-Kerberos at all? * 
>
>So before all, we should investigate in how far EAP-Kerberos improves
>the TLS-based solution. 
>
>For instance, the mandatory resistance to dictionary attacks. Thomas Wu
>has given in his Kerberos paper a hint how to mitigate this, however,
>even if there is a strong-password protocol without IPR claims,
>strong password methods suffer in general from heavy computation and thus
>the EAP method would have worse performance.
>
>Any comments are welcome
>Thomas
>
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