RE: [SECMECH] Framework Bindings Vs. Mechanism Bridges

Josh Howlett <josh.howlett@bristol.ac.uk> Fri, 26 August 2005 14:38 UTC

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Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 15:34:43 +0100
From: Josh Howlett <josh.howlett@bristol.ac.uk>
To: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>, "Salowey, Joe" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
Subject: RE: [SECMECH] Framework Bindings Vs. Mechanism Bridges
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--On Thursday, August 25, 2005 23:40:04 -0700 Bernard Aboba 
<aboba@internaut.com> wrote:
>> It could also be possible to still involve a AAA and have it terminate
>> the method and talk to the KDC. If you are trying to implement a method
>> that is evaluated by both the NAS and the AAA in the same transaction
>> you are really doing something other than EAP.
>
> In all the EAP Kerberos proposals I've seen the method is terminated on
> either the NAS or AAA server, but not both.  But in any scenario, the
> NAS still needs to support Kerberos, in order to validate the "network
> access" service ticket.

Just to clarify - it would be possible for the AAA server to authenticate 
against the KDC and return an EAP-Success to the NAS as per other EAP 
types, without the NAS needing to understand Kerberos. However, the NAS 
would need to understand Kerberos in order to allow a service ticket to be 
used for, ie, fast reconnect (...which is undesirable for secret hygene).

Right?

josh.

-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Josh Howlett, Networking & Digital Communications,
Information Systems & Computing, University of Bristol, U.K.
'phone: 0117 928 7850 email: josh.howlett@bris.ac.uk
------------------------------------------------------------

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