[Secret] Call for consensus on updated charter

Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> Tue, 14 June 2022 22:24 UTC

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From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "secret@ietf.org" <secret@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Call for consensus on updated charter
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Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 22:24:08 +0000
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Subject: [Secret] Call for consensus on updated charter
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Hi!

In February 2022, the virtual SECRET BOF was convened [1].  We had a robust discussion on the scope of work and an initial charter presented -- see the minutes [2].  Polling of the BoF participants showed a healthy consensus on understanding of the problem and interest to solve it in the IETF.  There also appeared to be a critical mass of energy to do this work.

The BoF feedback and subsequent AD review pointed to a few places for refinement to the charter, to include changing the proposed name of the WG.  That version is included below for your review.

The participants in the BoF showed consensus to proceed with chartering a WG.  Now with a revised charter, I'd like to continue this BoF conversion with an email thread to gauge interest to forming a WG to ensure we also capture views from those who were unable to attend the BoF or those who want to reiterate their positions.  Please respond to the list:

(1) Do you support the charter text? Or do you have objections or blocking concerns (please describe what they might be)?

If you do support the charter text:
(2) Are you willing to author or participate in the developed of the WG drafts?
(3) Are you willing to review the WG drafts?
(4) Are you interested in implementing the WG drafts?

If you previously spoke of at the BoF, you are welcome to repeat yourself here.

If you have been following along on the mailing list, the charter text below is the one that was being polished in GitHub (https://github.com/dimmyvi/secure-credential-transfer/blob/main/charter.md) with the milestones moved to the end.  

This call for feedback will end on Monday, June 27.

Thanks,
Roman

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2022-secret-01/session/secret
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/interim-2022-secret-01/materials/minutes-interim-2022-secret-01-202202100900-00.html

==[ snip ]==
WG Name = TIGRESS ("Transfer dIGital cREdentialS Securely")

There are many situations in which it is desirable to transfer a copy of a digital credential to another person. For example, you may want to provide access to your vehicle to a friend or a family member. You may also want to provide access to your home to your cat sitter. Or, you may want to transfer a copy of a hotel key to your spouse. Today, no such standardized method exists in a cross-platform, credential type-agnostic capacity.

The WG charter includes the definition and standardization of a protocol that will facilitate such credential transfers from one person's device to another person's device. The protocol will leverage a "relay server" to transfer data from sender to recipient. The scope of the transfer is limited to a single origin device and a single destination device. Note that neither private keys nor secret symmetric keys present on the sender's device are exchanged during the transfer operation. In the transfer protocol, the "credential" being transferred from sender to recipient comprises data both necessary and sufficient for the recipient to exchange with the credential authority for new digital key material granting the recipient a subset of the sender's capabilities or entitlements.

Privacy goals include:
* The relay server should not see sensitive details of the share
* The relay server should not be able to provision the credential itself, acting as an intermediary for the recipient (person-in-the-middle, impersonation attack)
* Aside from potentially the IP address, the relay server should not learn the identity of the sender or receiver

Sufficient security measures should be embedded in the protocol in an effort to:
* Ensure only the intended recipient is able to provision the credential
* Ensure the credential can only be provisioned once (anti-replay)
* Ensure the sender has intent to share (proof of the fact that the share initiation is attributed to a valid device and a user)

The solution the WG comes up with must:
* Allow a sender to initiate a share and define a relay server
* Allow a recipient to view the share request, and provision the credential associated with the share upon receipt
* Allow opaque message content based on the credential type (the protocol should be able to carry various types of credentials)
* Allow sender device and receiver device to perform multiple round trip communications within a limited time frame.
* Support a variety of types of credentials, to include those adhering to public standards (e.g., Car Connectivity Consortium) and proprietary (i.e., non-public or closed community) formats
* Allow opaque message content based on the credential type

Out of scope topics for the WG are:
* Defining the mechanism the receiver will use in order to provision the credential with the credential authority 
* The User Interface (UI) that is displayed to the sender or receiver during sending or receiving - this will depend on the device OEM's UI and HI guidelines.
* Defining the format or content of each field within the encrypted data (i.e., the provisioned credentials and associated information) stored on the relay server.

The WG will deliver a protocol to facilitate secure credential transfer. The WG must consider all Privacy and Security considerations in an effort to perform the credential transfer in a secure manner. The protocol will use appropriate cryptographic mechanisms to protect the transferred credentials in accordance with the security and privacy goals described above.

Planned Deliverables:

2022-12: WG adoption of the secure credential transfer protocol 
2023-12: Submit secure credential transfer protocol to the IESG for publication
==[ snip ]=