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Re: [sfc] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-integrity-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 15 July 2021 19:36 UTC

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Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 12:36:11 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Cc: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, gregimirsky@gmail.com, draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-integrity@ietf.org, sfc-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, sfc@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [sfc] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-sfc-nsh-integrity-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Wed, Jul 14, 2021 at 02:57:42PM +0530, tirumal reddy wrote:
> Hi Roman,
> 
> Please see inline
> 
> On Wed, 14 Jul 2021 at 00:33, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <
> noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
> 
[...]
> >
> > -- The text would benefit from a description on how to serialize the
> > packet for
> > hashing.  For example, Figure 6 and 7 are helpful logical descriptions of
> > the
> > integrity scope.  However, the MAC field itself is depicted as part of the
> > what
> > should get hashed.  Should that field be zeroed out? Removed ?
> >
> 
> Yes, we will update text as follows:
> 
> The NSH imposer sets the MAC field to zero and then computes the message
> integrity for the target NSH data (depending on the integrity protection
> scope discussed in Section 5) using MAC_KEY and HMAC algorithm. It inserts
> the computed digest in the MAC field in the "MAC and Encrypted Metadata"
> Context Header.

It's probably also worth updating the description of the verification
procedures to match; we typically see these done in tandem.

-Ben

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