Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches, or choose one?
"Adrian Farrel" <adrian@olddog.co.uk> Thu, 20 December 2018 18:52 UTC
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From: Adrian Farrel <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
To: "'Joel M. Halpern'" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "'Frank Brockners (fbrockne)'" <fbrockne@cisco.com>, sfc@ietf.org
References: <210af706ed8d4b73aa8c77a24777d622@XCH-RCD-008.cisco.com> <ef644b4b-afae-c5ea-da33-20ed63365988@joelhalpern.com>
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Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2018 18:52:32 -0000
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Subject: Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches, or choose one?
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I think I agree with Joel on this point. The nested encryption approach really did smell a bit :-) It was functional, but a rather sad solution. Since the 4S approach can now meet the requirement (that is quite important in security applications of SFC) to show ordered proof of transit, I should think the decision easy. Cheers, Adrian -----Original Message----- From: sfc <sfc-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Joel M. Halpern Sent: 16 December 2018 20:53 To: Frank Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com>; sfc@ietf.org Subject: Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches, or choose one? <no hats> Personally, the argument for just using SSSS, given that it now can provide ordered verification, seems quite persuasive to me. Yours, Joel <hat floating back on slowly> On 12/15/18 3:19 PM, Frank Brockners (fbrockne) wrote: > During the SFC WG at IETF 103 in Bangkok we raised the question, whether > we could simplify the draft and choose a single algorithm for > proof-of-transit only (see also > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/minutes-103-sfc-01). > Given that we could not come to a conclusion, we decided to take the > discussion to the list. > > Background: > > draft-ietf-sfc-proof-of-transit-01 describes two different approaches: > "nested encryption" and "Shamir's secret sharing scheme (SSSS)".. We > documented both approaches in the initial version of the draft, because > the two approaches had different qualities: While SSSS was > computationally cheaper (each node only needs to perform two additions, > a multiplication and a modulo-division), nested-encryption allowed to > verify that packets traversed a set of nodes in a particular order > ("ordered POT - OPOT") - something that the SSSS-approach in the initial > version of the draft did not offer. With the changes discussed in IETF > 102 and now documented in draft-ietf-sfc-proof-of-transit-01, both > approaches offer order preservation. > > In summary, we can now observe the following qualities of the two > approaches: > > * SSSS: Allows verification that a given set of nodes has been > traversed in a specific order (POT and OPOT). SSSS without order > preservation requires 2 additions, 1 multiplication, 1 division per > node participating in POT. Order preservation on top of that > requires an additional XOR (or similar). > * Nested-encryption: Allows verification that a given set of nodes has > been traversed in a specific order (POT and OPOT). The computational > effort of nested encryption depends on the crypto algorithm chosen > and typically higher than SSSS, i.e.. it requires/benefits from > hardware with specific capabilities (e.g. AES-NI). > > Question: > > Given that both approaches both solve the problem of POT and ordered > POT, should we consider simplifying the draft and describe only a single > approach? If so, which approach should we choose? > > I.e. when taking the computational effort into account and the fact that > options increase the burden for any implementor, we could decide to only > describe the SSSS approach in the draft. > > Thoughts? Opinions? > > Many thanks, Frank > > > > _______________________________________________ > sfc mailing list > sfc@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc > _______________________________________________ sfc mailing list sfc@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sfc
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Diego R. Lopez
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Diego R. Lopez
- [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approa… Frank Brockners (fbrockne)
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Joel M. Halpern
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Adrian Farrel
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… ao.ting
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Shwetha Bhandari (shwethab)
- Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both ap… Joel M. Halpern