Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches, or choose one?

"Adrian Farrel" <adrian@olddog.co.uk> Thu, 20 December 2018 18:52 UTC

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Reply-To: adrian@olddog.co.uk
From: Adrian Farrel <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
To: "'Joel M. Halpern'" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>, "'Frank Brockners (fbrockne)'" <fbrockne@cisco.com>, sfc@ietf.org
References: <210af706ed8d4b73aa8c77a24777d622@XCH-RCD-008.cisco.com> <ef644b4b-afae-c5ea-da33-20ed63365988@joelhalpern.com>
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Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2018 18:52:32 -0000
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Subject: Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches, or choose one?
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I think I agree with Joel on this point.

The nested encryption approach really did smell a bit :-) It was functional,
but a rather sad solution.

Since the 4S approach can now meet the requirement (that is quite important
in security applications of SFC) to show ordered proof of transit, I should
think the decision easy.

Cheers,
Adrian

-----Original Message-----
From: sfc <sfc-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Joel M. Halpern
Sent: 16 December 2018 20:53
To: Frank Brockners (fbrockne) <fbrockne@cisco.com>; sfc@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sfc] proof-of-transit: continue with both approaches, or
choose one?

<no hats>
Personally, the argument for just using SSSS, given that it now can 
provide ordered verification, seems quite persuasive to me.
Yours,
Joel
<hat floating back on slowly>

On 12/15/18 3:19 PM, Frank Brockners (fbrockne) wrote:
> During the SFC WG at IETF 103 in Bangkok we raised the question, whether 
> we could simplify the draft and choose a single algorithm for 
> proof-of-transit only (see also 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/minutes-103-sfc-01). 
> Given that we could not come to a conclusion, we decided to take the 
> discussion to the list.
> 
> Background:
> 
> draft-ietf-sfc-proof-of-transit-01 describes two different approaches: 
> "nested encryption" and "Shamir's secret sharing scheme (SSSS)".. We 
> documented both approaches in the initial version of the draft, because 
> the two approaches had different qualities: While SSSS was 
> computationally cheaper (each node only needs to perform two additions, 
> a multiplication and a modulo-division), nested-encryption allowed to 
> verify that packets traversed a set of nodes in a particular order 
> ("ordered POT - OPOT") - something that the SSSS-approach in the initial 
> version of the draft did not offer. With the changes discussed in IETF 
> 102 and now documented in draft-ietf-sfc-proof-of-transit-01, both 
> approaches offer order preservation.
> 
> In summary, we can now observe the following qualities of the two 
> approaches:
> 
>   * SSSS: Allows verification that a given set of nodes has been
>     traversed in a specific order (POT and OPOT). SSSS without order
>     preservation requires 2 additions, 1 multiplication, 1 division per
>     node participating in POT. Order preservation on top of that
>     requires an additional XOR (or similar).
>   * Nested-encryption: Allows verification that a given set of nodes has
>     been traversed in a specific order (POT and OPOT). The computational
>     effort of nested encryption depends on the crypto algorithm chosen
>     and typically higher than SSSS, i.e.. it requires/benefits from
>     hardware with specific capabilities (e.g. AES-NI). 
> 
> Question:
> 
> Given that both approaches both solve the problem of POT and ordered 
> POT, should we consider simplifying the draft and describe only a single 
> approach? If so, which approach should we choose?
> 
> I.e. when taking the computational effort into account and the fact that 
> options increase the burden for any implementor, we could decide to only 
> describe the SSSS approach in the draft.
> 
> Thoughts? Opinions?
> 
> Many thanks, Frank
> 
> 
> 
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