Re: [Shutup] [ietf-smtp] Proposed Charter for the "SMTP Headers Unhealthy To User Privacy" WG (fwd)

Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net> Wed, 02 December 2015 15:11 UTC

Return-Path: <dhc@dcrocker.net>
X-Original-To: shutup@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: shutup@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 758091A0025; Wed, 2 Dec 2015 07:11:41 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tny3V5Cl5OFO; Wed, 2 Dec 2015 07:11:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sbh17.songbird.com (sbh17.songbird.com [72.52.113.17]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2CCD01A0022; Wed, 2 Dec 2015 07:11:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [192.168.1.99] (76-218-10-206.lightspeed.sntcca.sbcglobal.net [76.218.10.206]) (authenticated bits=0) by sbh17.songbird.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id tB2FBc27002575 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 2 Dec 2015 07:11:39 -0800
References: <20151130042819.10658.qmail@ary.lan> <1448858775386-ceecd236-8b11ac04-a03b4438@fugue.com> <01PTPUIP3IUK01729W@mauve.mrochek.com> <11d014e5-9a6a-4b78-92a1-8e0a1e0a905d@gulbrandsen.priv.no> <lGTaHvC8ygXWFAuu@highwayman.com> <57B818513A0069189BA3CF41@JcK-HP8200.jck.com> <1449014394167-7d2dec58-2c6a9ae8-33fc8e7a@fugue.com> <565E4CCF.3080901@mustelids.ca> <1449024914920-c367c12b-5b2db232-b118a379@fugue.com> <565EB238.6060207@pscs.co.uk> <1449064251263-c451a28b-ba1e4af8-62e69b69@fugue.com>
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, shutup@ietf.org
From: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Organization: Brandenburg InternetWorking
Message-ID: <565F0A42.2070402@dcrocker.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 07:12:02 -0800
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.4.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <1449064251263-c451a28b-ba1e4af8-62e69b69@fugue.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.0 (sbh17.songbird.com [72.52.113.17]); Wed, 02 Dec 2015 07:11:39 -0800 (PST)
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/shutup/A8Q05g9RMMBmwtcT-AGi-A7336o>
Cc: ietf-smtp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Shutup] [ietf-smtp] Proposed Charter for the "SMTP Headers Unhealthy To User Privacy" WG (fwd)
X-BeenThere: shutup@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: dcrocker@bbiw.net
List-Id: SMTP Headers Unhealthy To User Privacy <shutup.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/shutup>, <mailto:shutup-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/shutup/>
List-Post: <mailto:shutup@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:shutup-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/shutup>, <mailto:shutup-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Dec 2015 15:11:41 -0000

On 12/2/2015 5:50 AM, Ted Lemon wrote:
> Wednesday, Dec 2, 2015 3:56 AM Paul Smith wrote:
>> > The thing is that whatever you do to email, the weak link is always the human. Humans are the ones who respond to Nigerian princes, they're the ones who think it's OK to send their bank password by email to anyone who asks for it in an authoritative way, etc.
>> > 
>> > So, training HAS to be done, otherwise people will lose privacy.
> Look, I'm really sorry to keep harping on this, because I know it's a bit off topic and probably annoying, but your model of how to do security for end users is simply wrong.   The way you prevent people from getting scammed is to by default not deliver email from people they don't know.   I realize this is anathema to a lot of email folks,


Absent hard data that shows efficacy, both of you are wrong.

At base, we don't know how to prevent folks from getting scammed, while
still allowing them to interact with the outside world.

Lots of people are sure they know the right answer here, but none of
them can document efficacy.  Worse, most of the ways people cite have
already been demonstrated to be inadequate or unachievable.

So yeah, this line of discussion is entirely out of scope.

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net