[sidr] RFC 8209 on A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests

rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org Thu, 28 September 2017 04:14 UTC

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Subject: [sidr] RFC 8209 on A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 8209

        Title:      A Profile for BGPsec Router 
                    Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 
                    and Certification Requests 
        Author:     M. Reynolds, 
                    S. Turner,
                    S. Kent
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       September 2017
        Mailbox:    mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com, 
                    sean@sn3rd.com, 
                    kent@alum.mit.edu
        Pages:      15
        Characters: 29355
        Updates:    RFC 6487

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-21.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC8209

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
known as BGPsec.  BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together.  BGPsec
is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
requirement to provide security for BGP.  The goal of BGPsec is to
provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives.  The end entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued to routers within an AS.  Each of these
certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate.  These CA
certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS Resource extension.
An EE certificate of this type asserts that
the router or routers holding the corresponding private key are
authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
AS(es) specified in the certificate.  This document also profiles the
format of certification requests and specifies Relying Party (RP)
certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates.
This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this document updates the
RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).

This document is a product of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
Internet Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the 
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