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Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?

Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> Mon, 30 January 2012 22:57 UTC

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Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 17:57:00 -0500
Message-ID: <CAH1iCiqGr8BJOk6nOpuTGTYNVJUwvXcdumTYbc=u1jBzyZQzmA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: "Murphy, Sandra" <Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com>, "sidr@ietf.org list" <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?
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On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 4:52 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
> At 2:57 PM -0500 1/30/12, Brian Dickson wrote:
>>
>> There are other kinds of encryption as well, which involve shared
>> keys, or in case of DH, random session keys with neither party
>> having/needing the other's key material.
>
>
> not true. DH key agreement requires that each party receive the public
> key of the other, in order to compute a shared secret.

In DH, each side generates a random (per-session) private key, and
computes _a_ public key (which is exchanged), off of that private key
.

Here's the thing - the "public key" in DH is not pre-published, nor is
it re-used. It is a one-use, fire-and-forget object, as are the
private key and shared key.

This is different from a published (public) key material a la PKI. PKI
keys are longer-lived and multiple-use.

In DH, neither party has the other's key _before_ they start their DH
exchange. That was my point.

Sorry for not making that more obvious.

Brian

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