Re: [sidr] Burstiness of BGP updates

Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Thu, 17 November 2011 01:17 UTC

Return-Path: <christopher.morrow@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3CD1F21F86A6 for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:17:54 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -103.552
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-103.552 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.047, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-1, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IvYXZDGkymYB for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:17:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-yw0-f44.google.com (mail-yw0-f44.google.com [209.85.213.44]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3E3921F86A1 for <sidr@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:17:53 -0800 (PST)
Received: by ywt34 with SMTP id 34so469649ywt.31 for <sidr@ietf.org>; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:17:53 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date :x-google-sender-auth:message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=xATBAP1f2rJHlnvrcrMyOtyxDKZIi40kRdKFHcAS6KI=; b=HoCG45aMs/9tW9k5Rj8iFYS910EQ1kIBzSV4V103MU+eVq7VKCq2IeRmSlNcBY2igu Lw6H/Fk2LpjnTgEAGKotpx0YxdhdAvw1SX+ECFe+fCQo6Z90cwT26KNLiMcUC/JoMmgj DsWMO8yCE6WBqzxsuwUBHyDvvMWqqvYMKru6k=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.50.184.202 with SMTP id ew10mr37165035igc.48.1321492672058; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:17:52 -0800 (PST)
Sender: christopher.morrow@gmail.com
Received: by 10.231.202.142 with HTTP; Wed, 16 Nov 2011 17:17:51 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <4EC459F0.9070200@riw.us>
References: <D7A0423E5E193F40BE6E94126930C49308E9E35567@MBCLUSTER.xchange.nist.gov> <m2fwhqeq5i.wl%randy@psg.com> <CCE759E6-BEA6-433B-957A-6559C67BAD52@ericsson.com> <DCC302FAA9FE5F4BBA4DCAD4656937791452387941@PRVPEXVS03.corp.twcable.com> <7309FCBCAE981B43ABBE69B31C8D21391A45A1FE9F@EUSAACMS0701.eamcs.ericsson.se> <DCC302FAA9FE5F4BBA4DCAD4656937791452387978@PRVPEXVS03.corp.twcable.com> <7309FCBCAE981B43ABBE69B31C8D21391A45A1FEC8@EUSAACMS0701.eamcs.ericsson.se> <4EC3125D.4000309@riw.us> <7309FCBCAE981B43ABBE69B31C8D21391A45A2061F@EUSAACMS0701.eamcs.ericsson.se> <4EC329C6.4090600@riw.us> <7309FCBCAE981B43ABBE69B31C8D21391A45A2062E@EUSAACMS0701.eamcs.ericsson.se> <4EC32EBE.6030106@riw.us> <7309FCBCAE981B43ABBE69B31C8D21391A45A20633@EUSAACMS0701.eamcs.ericsson.se> <E2D346C7800D704DB41ED19D90434DA6320C15DF93@ESESSCMS0358.eemea.ericsson.se> <4EC33E88.9090505@riw.us> <7309FCBCAE981B43ABBE69B31C8D21391A45A20649@EUSAACMS0701.eamcs.ericsson.se> <4EC459F0.9070200@riw.us>
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 20:17:51 -0500
X-Google-Sender-Auth: I1KbwWaRVxIbqb8cmp1axA8lAtM
Message-ID: <CAL9jLabyymUZJRk44Z00UeQsxinN5D-05-7_htmRanYwi7ysvQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: Russ White <russw@riw.us>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Cc: "sidr@ietf.org" <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] Burstiness of BGP updates
X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing <sidr.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr>
List-Post: <mailto:sidr@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 01:17:54 -0000

On Wed, Nov 16, 2011 at 7:48 PM, Russ White <russw@riw.us> wrote:
>
>> Does this now allow me to send passwords in the clear on the internet?
>
> 1. Protection means to know that the site you intend to get to is
> actually the site you reach.
> 2. Part of this protection requires protecting the routing system.
> 3. If you don't protect the routing system, then people are vulnerable
> to various attacks against their accounts on web sites they believe they
> can trust.
>
> Is it really that complex?
(not really aimed at russ)

is the never-ending rathole of 'what are we trying to protect' really
required on-list? I think the most simple case we care about is: "Is
the routing system telling us what it is supposed to?" Or rephrased
some: "Did the route injected at the source get faithfully reproduced
down the line to the receiver?"

I'd hope that leads us safer packets and traffic for all users of the
network, but really debating if plaintext passwds are safe is far too
deep in the weeds I think.

>
> What I see so far is:
>
> 1. SIDR has ruled out "knowing intentions." Without knowing intentions,
> you can't very well compare what you know to what you think you should know.
>
> 2. SIDR has ruled knowing what the actual state of the system currently
> is (well, at least we know what the system might have looked like a week
> or two ago, and maybe a new route has come along that isn't signed but
> that I should prefer over an already existing signed route, or
> perhaps...) If you don't know what the system is supposed to look like,
> then you don't know whether or not what you see is valid.
>
> Can you tell me what it is SIDR is actually securing?
>
> :-)
>
> Russ
> _______________________________________________
> sidr mailing list
> sidr@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
>