Re: [sidr] Burstiness of BGP updates

On Wed, Nov 16, 2011 at 7:48 PM, Russ White <russw@riw.us> wrote:
>
>> Does this now allow me to send passwords in the clear on the internet?
>
> 1. Protection means to know that the site you intend to get to is
> actually the site you reach.
> 2. Part of this protection requires protecting the routing system.
> 3. If you don't protect the routing system, then people are vulnerable
> to various attacks against their accounts on web sites they believe they
> can trust.
>
> Is it really that complex?
(not really aimed at russ)

is the never-ending rathole of 'what are we trying to protect' really
required on-list? I think the most simple case we care about is: "Is
the routing system telling us what it is supposed to?" Or rephrased
some: "Did the route injected at the source get faithfully reproduced
down the line to the receiver?"

I'd hope that leads us safer packets and traffic for all users of the
network, but really debating if plaintext passwds are safe is far too
deep in the weeds I think.

>
> What I see so far is:
>
> 1. SIDR has ruled out "knowing intentions." Without knowing intentions,
> you can't very well compare what you know to what you think you should know.
>
> 2. SIDR has ruled knowing what the actual state of the system currently
> is (well, at least we know what the system might have looked like a week
> or two ago, and maybe a new route has come along that isn't signed but
> that I should prefer over an already existing signed route, or
> perhaps...) If you don't know what the system is supposed to look like,
> then you don't know whether or not what you see is valid.
>
> Can you tell me what it is SIDR is actually securing?
>
> :-)
>
> Russ
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