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Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Path shortening & lengthening

Andrew Chi <achi@bbn.com> Fri, 06 April 2012 14:26 UTC

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Date: Fri, 06 Apr 2012 10:26:45 -0400
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Subject: Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Path shortening & lengthening
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On 3/29/2012 9:04 AM, Shane Amante wrote:
>Regardless, I think
> that its best to acknowledge, in this draft, that there is a threat of
> DoS to the availability of the BGP control plane

Maybe I'm missing something.

Intermediate routers or MITM entities can always drop updates.  If 
BGPSEC is enabled, then forging an AS4_PATH or modifying 
BGPSEC_PATH_Signature achieves no more than dropping the update.

Can you give a specific example of DoS that applies only to 
BGPSEC-enabled routers?

-Andrew

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