Re: [sidr] [Idr] Route Leaks and solutions

Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Mon, 20 July 2015 14:22 UTC

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Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 10:22:09 -0400
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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
To: "Sriram, Kotikalapudi" <kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov>
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Cc: idr wg list <idr@ietf.org>, "sidr wg list (sidr@ietf.org)" <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] [Idr] Route Leaks and solutions
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I think I see the current plan as a it challenging to depend upon...

If the RLP bit is dependent upon ops folks getting the right
config-bit set for each customer we would want that to be as much
automated as possible so there would be the least chance for 'forgot
to set the bit' or 'set bit incorrectly'.

I'm worried that I can't tell reliably what the bit was 2 as-hops
away, did they mean 'customer' ? or was that a mistake? Did someone
change it mid-path to me? Did the implementation of their vendor gear
change/set the wrong attribute value?

There seem to be a bunch of uncertainties with this, in my mind. I
guess that with bgpsec signing this attribute at least 'joe really
meant that jim was his customer', and you can't change the value on a
bgpsec path.

If we want that, I think having the attribute where it can get changed
(not-bgpsec secured paths) is a real problem, or opens up some pretty
large problems...