Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-00
Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 19 July 2016 14:33 UTC
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From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-00
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Tim, Thanks for taking the time to read and comment on the document. I will change CA certificate analysis to be section 2.1, and make the CRL section b 2.3, as per your request. The Manifest section will remain 2.2, ROAs will become 2.4, GB will become 2.5, and Router Certificates will remain 2.6. This will require a lot of changes to the pointers within and between sections, but we aim to please :-). A-5.4.1: I agree that reducing the set ofresources in a CA certificate may be done for legitimate reasons, even if the INR holder does not agree with the reduction. Nonetheless, this is an adverse action from the perspective of the INR holder. It’s important to note that there are cases when this reduction is the result of an attack against or an error by the parent CA. Thus I believe it is important to retain this action in the list. A-5.4.2: I’ll delete this action. A-5.4.5: I agree that this may be hard to distinguish from a legitimate key rollover, except that a key rollover would have both old and new CA keys present simultaneously. I’ll add a note to this effect. I disagree with your suggestion that we remove the modification, revocation, and injection actions for Manifests, ROAs, and Router Certificates. First, remember that adverse actions include errors by CAs, and transient attacks against CAs. In the former case the private key is clearly available and the CA may also control the repository. In the latter case note that an attacker need not need learn the private key’s value; he/she needs only the ability to cause an HSM to use the key. Also, an attacker need not control the repository to effect these actions; an RP might be misdirected to a different set of files via a routing system attack (ironic?) or a DNS attack. Recall that the goal of this document is to document, as best we can, a wide range of actions that are adverse, irrespective of whether we can prevent or detect such actions. Your message noted that RRDP may make it easier for RPs to detect some of these actions; I suggest you add references to the relevant sections of this document as further motivation for transitioning to RRDP. Finally, when we revised an earlier version of the document we decided to include every action in the same order in each section (except for GB records, where it would be trivial), to make it easier for a reader to see that we were addressing the same issues for each object. Steve
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Sriram, Kotikalapudi (Fed)
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Sandra Murphy
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Stephen Kent
- [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-00 Sandra Murphy
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Tim Bruijnzeels
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Sandra Murphy
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] wglc for draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actio… Christopher Morrow